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LESSONS LEARNED FROM COMPARING
THE APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW AND FEDERAL ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAW TO AFRICAN-
AMERICANS IN THE U.S. AND DALITS IN
INDIA IN THE CONTEXT OF
HIGHER EDUCATION1
Kevin D. Brown* and Vinay Sitapati**
In this Article the authors will compare the development of constitu-
tional law and federal anti-discrimination law in the context of higher
education of African-Americans in the U.S. with Dalits in India. Both
groups suffer from oppression and discrimination based upon a heredi-
tary trait and related to their integration into mainstream society; neither
group is completely isolated from the majority population responsible for
the discrimination; and African-Americans and Dalits approximate simi-
lar percentages of their country's population. Based upon the 2000 census,
African-Americans constitute 12.7% of the American population,2 and, ac-
cording to the 1991 Census Report of India, Dalits make up 16.5% of the
1. A draft of this article was presented by the authors at the "Comparative
Constitutional Traditions in South Asia Conference" sponsored by The Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University,
November 17 to 19, 2006 in London, England. We would like to thank the
distinguished participants at the Conference for their many helpful suggestions. We
would also like to thank Professor Japhet of the National Law School of India
University and noted Dalit journalist from New Delhi, Chandrabhan Prasad, for
their helpful insights over many years that have been incorporated into this article.
We also want to acknowledge assistance we received from Professors Jeannie Bell,
Robert Fischman, Don Gjerdingen, Feisal Istrabadi, Aviva Orenstein, Ken Dau-
Schmidt, Reginald Robinson, Susan Williams and Lalit Khandare.
* Professor of Law and Director of the Hudson & Holland Scholars Programs, Indi-
ana University Bloomington; B.S., Indiana University, 1978; J.D., Yale Law School,
1982.
** LLM candidate at Harvard Law School, 2008; Graduate of National Law School,
Bangalore, 2006.
2. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table 1: Population by Race, for Hispanic or Latino
Origin for all Ages and for 18 years and older for the United States 2000 (Apr. 2,
2001).
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Indian population.3 Yet, although African-Americans have been victims of
hereditary racial oppression in the U.S. for almost 400 years, Dalits have
suffered oppression for 3,500 years and counting.
In India, Caste Hindus have traditionally considered Dalits-members
of society located below the caste system,--to be religiously polluted be-
cause of their hereditary occupations. Dalits were-and for the most part
still are-confined to doing the worst work in India. Dalits take care of
trash and body disposal, maintain the sewage system, clean toilets, work
with dead animals, collect cow manure and turn it into cooking fuel, la-
bor in the fields, work on leather, and dig the wells for water. For millen-
nia, Caste Hindus denied Dalits the most basic human rights. They were
denied access to Hindu temples and to formal education, prohibited from
drawing water from public wells (often the very wells that they them-
selves dug), prevented from walking on the road in broad daylight and
compelled to wear dirty clothes--if they were allowed to wear clothes at
all. Caste Hindus segregated housing for Dalits and placed them on the
outskirts of town.
Though India is one of humanity's oldest civilizations, the Republic of
India was founded in 1947 when it gained independence from Great Brit-
ain's colonial control. For Dalits, the ratification of the Indian Constitution
in 1950 marks the watershed moment for their legal rights. With the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution, Indian society formally recognized the need to
address the historic oppression of many groups, including the Dalits,
which plagued Indian society for thousands of years.5 Many provisions
were included in the Indian Constitution to address the discrimination
Dalits faced. Regardless of the constitutionally required efforts aimed at
advancing Dalits over the past 60 years, a "number of recent sociological
studies indicate that.., the idea of their inherent pollution continues to
be what sets Dalits apart."6 A 2003 story in the National Geographic
News on Dalit oppression started by stating:
Human rights abuses against these people, known as Dalits, are
legion. A random sampling of headlines in mainstream Indian
newspapers tells their story: "Dalit boy beaten to death for pluck-
ing flowers"; "Dalit tortured by cops for three days"; "Dalit
'witch' paraded naked in Bihar"; "Dalit killed in lock-up at
Kurnool"; "7 Dalits burnt alive in caste clash"; "5 Dalits lynched
3. Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes Population, 1991 Census of India, at http://www.
censusindia.gov.in (last visited Feb. 25, 2007). Many of the statistics which exist in
the U.S. to demonstrate the socio-economic condition of blacks in comparison to
other racial/ethnic groups do not exist for determining the situation of Dalits. As
such, it is harder to find the statistics that quantify the socio-economic situation of
Dalits.
4. Members of this group prefer to be called "Dalits," which means broken, op-
pressed, or downtrodden. See John C.B. Webster, Who is a Dalit?, in UNTOUCHABLE:
DALITS IN MODERN INDIA 11 (S.M. Michael ed., 1999), for a brief discussion of whom
the term "Dalit" encompasses.
5. John C.B. Webster, Who Is a Dalit?, in UNTOUCHABLE: DALITS IN MODERN INDIA 11, 21-
23 (S.M. Michael ed., 1999).
6. Id. at 13.
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in Haryana"; "Dalit woman gang-raped, paraded naked"; "Police
egged on mob to lynch Dalits."7
According to Government of India statistics, in 1986-87 only 21.38% of
Dalits were literate, 16% lived in urban areas, 48% were agricultural la-
borers, 4% were employed in industrial occupations, and 50% lived be-
low the poverty line (compared to 30% of the entire population living
below the poverty line).8 Half of Dalits are landless agricultural laborers,
and only 7% have access to safe drinking water, electricity and toilets.9 A
survey of forty-one Indian higher education institutions showed that Dal-
its constituted only 0.61% of the professors, 1.04% of the associate profes-
sors, and 3.16% of the lecturers.10 In a society still marked in many places
by deprivation and destitution, Dalits are the most deprived and
destitute.
In contrast to African-Americans, Dalits have not made significant
progress towards eradication of their historic oppression over the past 60
years. Typically, when comparisons of the status and conditions of Afri-
can-Americans are made to another group, it is with non-Hispanic whites
in the United States. Due to the history of oppression suffered by the de-
scendants of the soil of Africa in the U.S., there is good reason for this
normal comparative framework. The comparison of differences between
the social, economic, education or political status of blacks and non-His-
panic whites is intended to illuminate the progress, or lack thereof, in the
efforts of American society to eliminate the effects of historic racial op-
pression. But such comparisons carry with them an inherent difficulty
and enduring problem for African-Americans. This normal comparative
framework used to judge the socio-economic condition of African-Ameri-
cans in the United States systematically fails to appreciate the strengths of
the African-American community and the positive aspects of its struggle
for racial liberation.
No matter how much progress African-Americans have made, in such
a comparative framework they are almost always portrayed as being too
discriminated against, committing too many crimes, too poor, too unem-
ployed, too undereducated, too short-lived, too underrepresented, or
having standardized test scores that are too low. Even if progress on the
road to racial equality is recognized, the almost always concomitant rec-
ognition is that African-Americans still have a long way to travel before
they reach their goal. Thus, the fire of the victory celebrations for the ac-
complishments of African-Americans is drowned in the water of despair
that comes from the recognition that much is left to be done.
7. Hillary Mayell, India's "Untouchables" Face Violence, Discrimination, NATIONAL GEO-
GRAPHIC NEWS, June 2, 2003, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/06/
0602_030602_untouchables.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2007).
8. B.L. Mungekar, State, Market, and the Dalits, in UNTOUCHABLE: DALITS IN MODERN
INDIA 131, 134 (S.M. Michael ed., 1999).
9. Mari Marcel Thekaekara, Combatting Caste, THE NEW NATIONALIST, July 2005, http:/
/www.newint.org/features/2005/07/01 /combatting_caste/ (internal citations
omitted).
10. Mungekar, supra note 8, at 137.
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Notwithstanding the societal differences between the United States
and India, this comparison of the application of constitutional and federal
discrimination laws to the higher education opportunities for African-
Americans and Dalits should yield some important lessons, especially for
appreciating the African-American struggle for equality. Our intention in
this Article is to look at African-Americans from a comparative frame-
work that is positive as opposed to negative. In so doing we can highlight
some of the successes of the African-American Community in its historic
struggle and the strengths in American society that can make continued
advancement possible.
There are a number of reasons to focus on opportunities for higher
education. First, globalization has increased the value of knowledge.
Higher education is where the most valued knowledge is created and dis-
seminated. Second, in the United States, prestigious occupational oppor-
tunities are tied to education credentials. Thus, the best way to assure an
individual access to a socially and economically advantageous career in
the U.S. is through ensuring access to a college or university degree. For
Indians the benefits of globalization are often tied to education as well.
Those who seem to benefit the most in India from globalization are in the
service sector."1 Education is a critical determinant of who receives the
most sought-after employment opportunities in that sector. Third, policy
making in India is dominated by upper caste Hindus whose percentages
in important social positions far exceeds their percentage of the popula-
tion.12 More Dalits in higher education should translate into more Dalits
in decision making positions in the economy, media, politics and educa-
tion. The same holds true in the United States as well. Holders of degrees
from higher education institutions in the United States come to occupy
the boardrooms, the corner offices, the faculty lounges, the press rooms,
the Courthouses and the Statehouses. Higher education is also a hedge
for both individual blacks in the United States and Dalits in India to com-
bat negative stereotypical assumptions that have long plagued members
of these groups. Finally, individuals who have tremendous influence over
society's culture are primarily those who are well-educated. Thus, access
to higher education can also influence how society regards Dalits and Af-
rican-Americans in the future.
11. India's manufacturing and service sectors have grown at an average of around 9%
in the last 10 years. However, agriculture has only grown at around 2% in the same
period, even though 60% of the Indian labor force is in agriculture. See http://
www.indiadaily.com/editorial/3380.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). In addition, the
service sector's share of GDP has grown from 43.69% in 1990-91 to 51.16% in 1998-
99. In contrast, the agricultural sector's share has fallen from 30.93% to 26.83% in the
respective years. See An Analysis of India's Service Sector, THE SERVICE SECTOR IN THE
INDIAN ECONOMY, http://www.indiaonestop.com/serviceindustry.htm (last visited
Dec. 27, 2007).
12. Data on this is naturally hard to find. But, for instance, a study of top media posi-
tions in India concluded that out of 315 top decision makers in media, 71% were
upper caste men, while there were no Dalits at all in this list. See Upper Castes Domi-
nate National Media, Says Survey in Delhi, THE HINDU, June 5, 2006, http://www.
hinduonnet.com/2006/06/05/stories/2006060504981400.htm.
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Section I will present an overview of the legal treatment of African-
Americans and Dalits over time. Section II will discuss the application of
constitutional law and federal anti-discrimination law to African-Ameri-
cans in the context of higher education. Section III will discuss the appli-
cation of constitutional law and federal anti-discrimination law to Dalits
in the context of higher education. Section IV will discuss five principal
lessons learned from this comparison. First, judicial interpretation of each
country's constitutional equal protection clause reduced educational op-
portunities for the oppressed. This simply reflects the double-edged-
sword nature of individual rights. On one hand, the theory of individual
rights seeks to eradicate conscious discrimination, yet on the other hand,
it provides the logic to undercut policies and programs motivated by a
conscious desire to attenuate the effects of that discrimination because
they take specific traits into account. Such policies are often viewed as
reverse discrimination. The second lesson evidences the benefits of hav-
ing a specific provision in the Constitution to protect the government
when it makes special provisions for the advancement of oppressed
groups. The Indian Constitution includes such a provision but the United
States Constitution does not.
The third lesson derives from comparing the justifications for affirma-
tive action that exist in the United States to those for reservations in India.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger3 identified
substantial benefits from affirmative action, including bettering cross-ra-
cial understanding, breaking down racial stereotypes, and improving na-
tional security. In contrast, the only justification for reserving seats for
Dalits in higher education in India is compensating for the long history of
untouchability and oppression. In the United States, many proponents of
affirmative action, including one of the authors,,4 would justify it on simi-
lar notions of responding to historic discrimination. This presents the rhe-
torical question of whether it is better to enter into an institution of higher
learning with the goal of learning from a diverse group, or due to a sense
of guilt about the past oppressive treatment of one's group. Justifications
for affirmative action in the United States carry a much more positive
connotation than the rationales for reservations for Dalits. Fourth, a sys-
tem of historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) were created
during the "separate but equal" era in the United States, providing many
blacks with opportunities for higher education and becoming symbolic of
self-help. The normal debate surrouding HBCUs in the United States evi-
dences the paradox of their existence. HBCUs are criticized for their
shortcomings in comparison to mainstream higher educational institu-
tions, yet praised because they are essential institutions serving the inter-
ests and needs of the black community. As Professor Gil Kujovik put it,
"the worst qualities of the colleges made them candidates for extinction
while their best qualities made them essential institutions serving the
13. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
14. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, The Hypothetical Opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger From the Per-
spective of the Road Not Taken in Brown v. Board of Education, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 83
(2004); Kevin Brown, The Racial Gap in Ability: From the Fifteenth Century to Grutter
and Gratz, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2061 (2004).
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needs of the black community."15 While African-Americans had access to
education at HBCUs, Dalits were not admitted to any educational institu-
tion, and therefore did not enjoy this marginal success that African-Amer-
icans did.
The fifth lesson relates to the changing racial and ethnic make-up of
blacks benefiting from affirmative action. Currently, most affirmative ac-
tion programs at selective colleges, universities, and graduate programs
do not draw racial and ethnic distinctions among black applicants. There
is growing evidence, however, of an increasing under-representation of
"Ascendants" among black college students.6 Terminology is going to be
a very difficult aspect of this part of the Article because it requires that we
think of blacks in the United States with conscious reference to their an-
cestry. We use the term "Ascendants" to refer to two different groups of
people. The first group is composed of those born in the United States
who have four grandparents that would have been considered as "black"
Americans at the time they were born.17 These Ascendants are third-gen-
eration African-Americans. However, due to historic racial oppression,
the disdain for interracial marriage and classification of mixed-race black
children as "black" for such a long period of America's history, we be-
lieve that any individual with a significant amount of black ancestry born
before the Supreme Court's 1967 opinion in Loving v. Virginia18 should
also be considered as an Ascendant.9 Such a person would have grown
up in conditions where the racism of his or her time demanded that he or
she consider himself or herself to be black, despite a mixed-race heritage.
The reason that we are using the term Ascendants in this case is to iden-
tify the line of ancestry through to ancestors who were chattel slavery
and/or experienced segregation.0 We use the term "Black Biracials" to
15. Gil Kujovich, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black Public College: The
Era of Separate But Equal, 72 MINN. L. REV. 29, 159 (1987).
16. Harvard professors Dr. Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Lani Guinier pointed out during
a black alumni gathering in 2003 that both the children of African and Caribbean
immigrants and the children of biracial couples together comprised two-thirds of
Harvard's black undergraduate population. A year later an article by Ronald Roach
pointed to the fact that a report of the black presence in elite colleges and universi-
ties revealed that 41% of black freshmen at 28 selective schools identified them-
selves as immigrants, children of immigrants or mixed-race. Ronald Roach, Drawing
Upon the Diaspora, DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, Aug. 25, 2005, http://
www.diverseeducation.com/artman/publish/article_4558.shtml (last visited Dec.
10, 2007).
17. According to Census Bureau data from the 2000 census, 89.9% of blacks were third
generation or higher. See Dianne Schmidley, Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in
the United States, 2000 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Popluation Reports Series P-23-
2006, 24 (2001).
18. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down anti-miscegenation statutes).
19. We do not believe that there is any particular magic in using 1967 as our date (for a
discussion on this, see RAINER SPENCER, CHALLENGING MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY 63-82
(2006)). However, we see it as a convenient date for this discussion.
20. We wish to also specifically acknowledge the insightful article written by Professor
Angela Onwuachi Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1141
(2007). She used the term "Descendants" or "Legacy Blacks" to denote these blacks
to make the connection between their ancestral lineage as descended from blacks
who were enslaved and/or segregated. She credits Professor Derrick Bell of New
York University Law School with providing her with the term. Id. at 1149. We use
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refer to individuals born after the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Lov-
ing who have one parent that is black and one that is not. We use the term
"Black Immigrants" to refer to individuals who were born in a foreign
land or have at least one parent born outside of the United States. We use
the terms "Black," "African-American," or "black" in the historic and
inclusive sense of referring to all people in the United States who are of
African descent.21 It is too early to tell what impact the increasing diver-
sity of the black population will have on affirmative action. However,
increasing interracial marriages and cohabitation reflect weakening racial
barriers and increasing social interaction between racial groups in
America. In India, however, racial barriers remain strong. Dalits who
marry Caste Hindus often must flee their homes to avoid "honor kill-
ings" by relatives of the higher-caste spouse.
I. DOMINANT HISTORICAL LEGAL TREATMENT OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS
AND DALITS THROUGH THE MODERN ERA
A. Legal Treatment of African-Americans in the United States from the
Colonial Period through the Era of Legal Segregation
The first successful British colony planted in North America by the
British was at Jamestown, Virginia in 1607. John Rolfe's casual reference to
the arrival of black slaves in Jamestown twelve years later is generally
regarded as the first time Africans were imported into British North
America.22 By the time the Founding Fathers met in Philadelphia in 1787,
blacks had been in North America for almost 170 years, and inclusion of
chattel slavery as an institution in the Constitution was a foregone con-
clusion. Not one of the fifty-five delegates present at the Constitutional
Convention seriously advocated the abolition of slavery.3 Instead, the
Founding Fathers addressed it in a number of provisions, the most impor-
tant of which was the infamous Three-Fifths Clause.24
During the slavery era, the most authoritative legal decision delivered
by the Supreme Court delineating the constitutional rights of blacks was
the term "Ascendant" because, in keeping with the general tenor of this article, it is
a more positive meaning that respects blacks' overcoming of aspects of America's
legacy of racial subordination. Without this overcoming by Ascendants, conditions
in the U.S. may not have changed enough to provide for a significant number of
Black Biracial children and immigration by blacks to the United States from other
parts of the world.
21. We will also be citing to various statistical reports and documents throughout this
Article. When we do so, we will use the terms that were used in those reports and
documents.
22. CAPTAINE JOHN SMITH, THE GENERALL HISTORIE OF VIRGINIA, NEW ENGLAND, AND
THE SUMMER ISLES 246-47 (vol. 1, 1907). This account can also be found reprinted in
CIVIL RIGHTS AND AFRICAN-AMERICANS 4 (Albert P. Blaustein & Robert L. Zangrando
eds., 1991).
23. See JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARA-
TIONS 12 (2000).
24. See, e.g., James Madison, Federalist Papers No. 54 (1788) ("The Federal Constitution,
therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views
them in the mixt character of persons and property. This is in fact their true
character.").
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Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.25 Dred Scott was a
slave whose master took him into the State of Illinois, which prohibited
slavery, and into a federal government-controlled territory that also
banned slavery.26 Scott sought his freedom by going to federal court and
arguing that a slave brought onto free soil was a free man.27 In concluding
that the slave and would-be free man, Dred Scott, could not sue in federal
court to obtain his freedom, Chief Justice Taney examined the original
intent of the Founders of the United States.28 Taney stated that people of
African descent-slave or free-were not considered by the Founders to
be citizens within the definition of the Constitution.29 As a result, the fed-
eral courts were closed to them.30 Taney went on to summarize the basic
constitutional view of the Founding Fathers regarding the rights of blacks
in the following way:
[Blacks] had for more than a century before [the Declaration of
Independence] been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and
altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or
political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect. 31
During the slavery era, the overwhelming majority of blacks lived in
the South and were slaves. The 1860 census revealed that 92% of blacks
lived in slaveholding states and 94% of them were in bondage.32 Though
blacks were generally not slaves in the North before the Civil War, they
were locked into the bottom of the racial social order by custom, if not by
law. Blacks were systematically separated from whites or excluded from
railway cars, omnibuses, stagecoaches and steamboats; they were segre-
gated into "secluded and remote corners of theaters and lecture halls;
they could not enter most hotels, restaurants and resorts, except as ser-
vants"; they prayed in separate pews and partook of the sacrament of the
Eucharist after whites.3 They were segregated in housing, schools, hospi-
tals and cemeteries. Segregation came to encompass virtually all aspects
of life, literally extending from the cradle to the grave.
Even though there were abolitionist movements and individuals that
sought to restrict the spread of slavery, slavery was firmly rooted in the
soil of the southern states during this period. It took a national crisis of
such a magnitude that it threatened the disintegration of the Union to
terminate slavery. Such a crisis developed after the presidential election
of 1860. Abraham Lincoln, though opposed to the institution of slavery,
25. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
26. Id. at 431.
27. Id. at 427.
28. Id. at 407-18.
29. Id. at 427.
30. Id. at 445-46.
31. Id. at 407.
32. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Ser. P-23, No. 80, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF
THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL VIEW, 1790-1978, at 13
(1979).
33. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES (1961)
(presenting an authoritative account of the treatment of African-Americans north of
the Mason Dixon Line).
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came into the Presidency emphasizing that he only wished to prevent its
expansion. Lincoln attempted to avert a civil war and was willing to ac-
cept a proposed amendment to the Constitution that would guarantee
slavery in the South.34 While the amendment was approved by both
houses of Congress,35 this effort was too little and too late to avoid seces-
sion and Civil War.
Using his constitutional powers as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, on January 1, 1863, Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proc-
lamation. The Proclamation, however, only sought to free slaves that
were in the areas then in rebellion. Excluded from its provisions were
slaves in Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, portions of Louisiana
and Virginia, and in the areas of Tennessee occupied by the Union.36 As a
result, the Emancipation Proclamation left over one million black slaves
in the hands of masters who were considered loyal to the Union. Ratifica-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment in December 1865, however, elimi-
nated any lingering instances of slavery.
Black troops played a significant role in the ultimate defeat of the
Confederate Army. In a public letter written in September 1864, Lincoln
noted that if you threw away the support of black troops, you would
throw away the Union.37 They volunteered and served in huge numbers.
Official statistics show that almost 179,000 black soldiers served in the
Union army.38 An additional 29,000 comprised 25% of the Union sailors.39
Approximately 37,300 black soldiers were killed during the war-over
10% of the Union soldiers killed in action and almost 1% of the black
population of the country-which is a remarkably high number given the
fact that they were generally excluded from fighting for the first twenty
months of the war.40
With the Civil War won and slavery abolished, the United States had
to turn to the issues of reconstruction and lasting peace. The victory of the
North on the battlefield and the heroic performance of black troops did
not translate into an acceptance of blacks as equals, particularly in the
war-torn South. As southern governments that participated in the rebel-
lion were reconstituted in the summer and fall of 1865, the first order of
legislative business was to address the status of the newly made freed-
men. These southern legislators passed a series of laws that came to be
known as the "Black Codes." The goal of the Black Codes was to imple-
ment into law the oppression of blacks, specifically through forced la-
34. See FEAGIN, supra note 23, at 57.
35. See id.
36. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at
1 (1988).
37. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE NEGRO'S CIVIL WAR 238 (1991).
38. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
355 (1991).
39. MAULANA KARENGA, INTRODUCTION TO BLACK STUDIES 144 (2nd ed. 1993).
40. It has been estimated that the mortality rates of the black troops was 40% higher
than that of white troops. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM
SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 70 (6th ed. 1988).
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bor.41 Among the provisions in various Black Codes were requirements
that the former slaves sign labor contracts by the beginning of the year
with the landowners that could not be broken during that year.42 These
contracts generally provided for agricultural labor.43 All black persons not
gainfully employed as of the first of the year were considered vagrants
and, upon conviction, were fined and imprisoned.44 If the landowner or
some other person paid their fines, the convicted were placed in ward-
ship of the payor until the debt was repaid.45 Opportunities for black
workers were severely limited. Prohibited from owning their own land,
they were compelled to work for others.46 They were also restricted in
other areas of life: prohibited from owning firearms; prohibited from tes-
tifying against whites; and segregated on public transportation.47
From 1865 to 1870, three Amendments-the Thirteenth, Fourteenth
and Fifteenth, collectively referred to as the "Reconstruction Amend-
ments"-were added to the Constitution. The principal motivation for
the Reconstruction Amendments was the desire to protect the rights of
the newly freed blacks. The 39th Congress assembled in Washington D.C.
in January 1866 against the backdrop of the adoption of the Black Codes
and recalcitrance from the reconstituted southern governments. The ses-
sion started with a continuation of the Civil War ban prohibiting citizens
from the eleven states that participated in the rebellion from serving in
Congress. Congress began to debate a civil rights bill (the Civil Rights Act
of 1866) that would give meaning to the Thirteenth Amendment by assur-
ing that black people possessed basic civil rights.48 In addition, the unin-
tended impacts of the Thirteenth Amendment needed to be addressed.
When slaves were freed, they no longer constituted three-fifths of a per-
son, which would increase the apportionment to slaveholding states of
representatives in the lower house of Congress and votes in the Electoral
College. The Thirteenth Amendment, then, would actually increase the
voting power of the states that had the most slaves before the Civil War,
redistributing political power at the national level in favor of the very
states that had rebelled.
Congress debated the Fourteenth Amendment during the first months
of its 1866 term. Section 1 of the Amendment bestowed upon blacks the
status of citizenship of the United States and the state where they resided;
prohibited states from abridging their privileges or immunities as citizens
of the United States; prohibited states from depriving them of life, liberty
or property without due process; and granted them the equal protection
of the laws.49 The Amendment, however, did not grant black males politi-
41. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN- V BOARD OFEDU-
CATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 44 (2004).
42. See, e.g., id.
43. See, e.g., id.
44. See, e.g., id.
45. See, e.g., id.
46. See, e.g., id.
47. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 41, at 630.
48. See e.g., id. at 46-47.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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cal equality.50 Section 2 dealt with the anomaly created by the abolition of
slavery and was also intended to be an inducement to the states to en-
courage them to grant black males the right to vote. Under this provision,
if a state enfranchised the freedmen, then the former slaves would count
in determining the state's representation in the lower house of Congress
and the Electoral College. But if a state refused to grant the right to vote
to the freedmen over the age of 21, then the state's representation would
be reduced in proportion to the number such freedmen bore to the whole
number of the male population over the age of 21.51
During the second half of 1866, ten of the eleven states of the former
Confederacy rejected the Fourteenth Amendment.52 In response, Congress
disbanded their governments and divided those states into five military
districts under commanders authorized to use the army to protect life and
property. 3 To gain readmittance as states, the districts had to ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment and hold a constitutional convention to include
universal suffrage in the new states' constitutions.54 In February of 1870,
the Fifteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution, prohibiting de-
nial or abridgement of the right to vote based upon race, color or condi-
tion of previous servitude.55
In an 1873 opinion that became known as the Slaughterhouse Cases, the
Supreme Court openly embraced the Reconstruction Amendments,
stating:
On the most casual examination of the language of these amend-
ments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading
purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and
without which none of them would have been even suggested; we
mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm estab-
lishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had for-
merly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is true that only
the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speaking of his
color and his slavery. But it is just as true that each of the other articles
was addressed to the grievances of that race, and designed to remedy
them as the fifteenth.56
50. At this point American society disenfranchised women as well. The 19th Amend-
ment, which forbids the United States or any state from denying or abridging the
right to vote based on sex, was not ratified until 1920.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment barred from
any civil or military office at both the state and federal levels those who served in
federal or state office and then engaged in the rebellion. Thus, Section 3 made virtu-
ally the entire political leadership of the former Confederate states before the war
ineligible for public office. In so doing, Section 3 sought to institute a sweeping
change in southern politics-without granting blacks the right to vote-by attempt-
ing to ensure that whites who were loyal to the Union controlled the reconstituted
southern governments. Section 4 invalidated all public debt issued by the rebellious
states to support the Confederacy. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3, 4.
52. See KLUGER, supra note 41, at 47.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 47-49.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
56. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71-72 (1873) (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court in that opinion went on to make a specific statement
about the limits of the Equal Protection Clause:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account
of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this
provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emer-
gency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to
any other.57
An important turning point for the new rights of blacks was the dis-
puted Presidential election of 1876 between Republican Rutherford B.
Hayes and Democrat Samuel Tilden. As part of what became known as
the "Compromise of 1877," the Democrats agreed to allow the Republi-
can candidate to become President in exchange for withdrawing the fed-
eral troops in place to protect the rights of the freedmen in the former
Confederate states, leaving the fate of blacks in the hands of the states.5 8
Although southern politicians pledged to protect the new legal rights of
the freedmen, during the 1880s and 1890s, blacks were eliminated as an
effective voting force in the South. State legislatures then began to enact
segregation policies into law.
Legal segregation was upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson, when the Supreme
Court addressed an equal protection challenge to a statute requiring
"separate but equal" accommodations on a railroad passenger car.59 Jus-
tice Brown's opinion for the Court stated that "in the nature of things [the
Fourteenth Amendment] could not have been intended to abolish distinc-
tions based upon color or to enforce social, as distinguished from political
equality."60 Brown goes on to note "[i]f one race be inferior to the other
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the
same plane."61 Thus, segregation based upon the belief that blacks were
inferior to whites had been codified into law.
Three years after Plessy, the Court, in a public education decision, sig-
naled that the requirement of equality did not need to be taken literally.
In Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, the Supreme Court
permitted the Board of Education to apply tax revenue to subsidize the
cost of high school education for white students, but provide no subsidy
for black high school students.2 Even though the facts of the Cumming
case were somewhat unusual and the legal arguments made on behalf of
the black community mishandled, Cumming came to stand for the pro-
position that while separation was clearly constitutional, equality was not
required.63 After Plessy, segregation statutes quickly spread throughout
much of the southern United States.
57. Id. at 81.
58. See JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARA-
TIONS 58 (2000).
59. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
60. Id. at 544.
61. Id. at 551-52.
62. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
63. KEVIN BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA: FOUR
PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION 58 (2005).
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The era of legal segregation continued until 1954, when Brown v. Board
of Education64 dealt a mortal blow to legal segregation and ushered in a
very different constitutional regime for African-Americans. The Court's
opinion in Brown is recognized as the first time that the U.S. attempted to
extend its basic creed of liberty and justice for all to African-Americans.
B. Legal Treatment of Dalits up to Ratification of the Constitution
Around 16% of India's population (approximately 160 million people)
are Dalits.65 Dalits have also been called "untouchables," "outcastes,"
and "avama" or "panchamas" (the fifth caste) to illustrate that they fall
outside the four recognized castes in Hinduism. In 1919, the controlling
British government changed these degrading terms to "Depressed Clas-
ses."66 The leader of India's Independence movement, Mahatma Gandhi,
preferred using the term "Harijans" (people of God).67 However, many
Dalit leaders felt that this term was condescending. For instance, Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar, the brilliant lawyer and an ardent advocate of the Dalit rights,
rejected Gandhi's terminology and proposed the term "Protestant
Hindus."68 In 1935, the British government developed a list of Dalit sub-
castes that it defined as the "Schedule Castes."69 After Independence, the
Indian Constitution continued to use the term "Schedule Castes."70 Thus,
all official documentation refers to Dalits as "Scheduled Castes." This Ar-
ticle uses the terms Dalits and "Schedule Castes" interchangeably.
The renowned Indian historian S.K. Chaterjee defines Dalits as pre-
Aryan people who have lived for thousands of years on the Indian soil.71
The conventional (though controversial) theory of Indian history is that
around 1500 B.C.E., Aryans from central Asia invaded the Indian subcon-
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65. Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes Population, 1991 Census of India, available at
http://www.censusindia.net/scst.html (last visited Sep. 21, 2006).
66. Government of India Act (1919).
67. Paul F. Power, Harijan: A Journal of Applied Gandhiism, 1933-1955, 70 AM. POL. ScI.
REV. 651, 651 (1976) (book review).
68. Robert Traer, Buddhist Affirmations of Human Rights, 8 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUD. 13,
13 (1988).
69. Government of India Act s. 305 (1935) brought the term 'Scheduled Castes' into use,
and defined the group as including "such castes, races or tribes or parts of groups
within castes, races or tribes, which appear to His Majesty in Council to correspond
to the classes of persons formerly known as the 'Depressed Classes,' as His Majesty
in Council may prefer." This decidedly vague definition was clarified in The Gov-
ernment of India Scheduled Castes Order (1936), which contained a list, or Sched-
ule, of castes throughout the British provinces.
70. INDIA CONST. art. 366, cl. 24 defines "Scheduled Caste" to mean such castes, races or
tribes or parts of or groups which are deemed under INDIA CONST. art. 341 to be
Scheduled Castes for the purposes of this Constitution. INDIA CONST. art. 341, cl. 1
empowers the President of India to specify the castes, races or tribes or parts or
groups within castes that can be deemed to be Scheduled Castes. It is then the role
of Parliament (as per INDIA CONST., art. 341, cl. 2) to make law concerning the
groups thus designated. It is important to note that this precludes the role of the
Courts in scrutinizing this initial right of the President, and subsequent right of
Parliament.
71. See Felix Raj SJ, Religion And Dalit Identity, The Goethals Indian Library and Re-
search Society, http://www.goethals.org/rdiden.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
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tinent and subjugated the Dravidian race, who were believed to be the
original inhabitants of the subcontinent.72 Progressive Dalit groups be-
lieve that they were the original inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent.73
They point to the fact that the Aryans (whom they hold to be the upper
castes Hindus of today) had distinct features such as fair skin and sharp
facial features, while Dalits have darker skin.74 Other explanations for the
origin of Dalits interpret differences in physical features to mean that they
belong to a race closely allied with the Africans and Australoids.75 These
theories are controversial and are by no means universally accepted, and
their resolve is beyond the scope of this Article; we mean to focus not on
the origin of Dalits, but the oppression they have suffered over time.
This oppression can best be understood in the context of India's caste
system. In traditional Hindu society, occupations were allocated among
different social groups according to Hindu law and custom that demon-
strated the "classic expression of inequality [through] caste."76 The caste
system can be broken down into four distinct 'varnas' or occupational
groupings: the Brahmins (priests and teachers), the Ksyatriyas [Ksha-
triyas] (rulers and soldiers), the Vais [Vaishayas] (merchants and traders),
and the Shudras [Sudras] (labourers and artisans).77 The first three caste
groups dominate Indian society, and are collectively referred to as 'high
caste' or 'forward caste' Hindus.8 The Shudras are to serve the other three
castes and are stigmatized by Hindu society, made outcasts and pre-
vented from earning and accumulating wealth. Below the Shudras, how-
ever, are the Dalits. Each of these five broad groups can be broken down
into subcastes or "jatis," which further define an individual's position in
72. This theory, first used by Indologist Max Mueller, was accepted by the social re-
former Jyotiba Phule in Maharashtra, who went on to argue that, therefore, the in-
heritors of the land in India are the lower castes because they are the original
Indians and the upper castes are the Aryans that came as alien invaders. One of
India's foremost historians, Romila Thappar, discusses these theories in The Aryan
Question Revisited, transcript of lecture delivered on October 11, 1999, at the Academic
Staff College, JNU, http://members.tripod.com/ascjnu/aryan.html (last visited Feb.
18, 2008).
73. DALIT VOICE, Homepage, http://www.dalitvoice.org/about.htm (last visited Mar.
22, 2008).
74. V.T. Rajshekar, Reply to Anit-reservation Racists, DALIT VOICE, http://www.dal-
itvoice.org/Templates/august2006/articles.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
75. THE SUNDROID (INDO-AFR1CAN) RACE, http: / /www.geocities.com/Athens/Ithaca/
1335/Anthro/sud-afr.html (last visited Feb. '18, 2008).
76. SRINIVAS, CASTE IN MODERN INDIAN AND OTHER ESSAYS 88 (1962).
77. See DEVANESAN NESIAH, DISCRIMINATION WITH REASON? THE POLICY OF RESERVATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES, INDIA AND MALAYSIA 37 (1997).
78. It is estimated that Brahmins hold more than 70% of government posts. See Henry
Chu, A Gift for India's Inter-caste Couples, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at A6. In addition,
Brahmins hold 78% of the judicial positions and approximately 50% of parliamen-
tary seats in India. India Human Rights Report, NCBuy Country reference, www.
ncbuy.com/reference/country/humanrights-toc.html?code=in (last visited Feb. 18,
2008) (The Human Rights report is submitted to the Congress of the United States of
America by the Department of State. Reports address internationally recognized
human rights issues for countries which receive assistance through the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961, and all other foreign countries which are members of the
United Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human rights report
under this act.).
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Indian society. 79 There are an estimated 2000-3000 subcastes in modem
India, "ranging from small groups of a few hundred individuals to large
groups numbering a few million."80 Some jatis exist only in a particular
locality, while others are found throughout India.81
A critical feature of the caste system is hierarchy. Every one of the
subcastes is hierarchically ordered. Thus, the social order in Indian soci-
ety is structured in terms of privileges and disabilities of groups rather
than the rights of individuals. Markers of subcaste hierarchy tended to
bind members of the same jatis together. The common history of a partic-
ular jati oppressing lower subcastes and experiencing oppression by
higher subcastes produces a strong sense of group identity. Caste ensured
that there was little concern in Indian society for the rights of individuals
for thousands of years. Hindu society excluded whole segments of society
from positions of respect and responsibility without consideration of indi-
vidual talents, abilities or interests.82 The discriminatory treatment of
Shudras was severe and encompassed every aspect of social life. The
drafters of the Indian Constitution provided that the government could
adopt policies and programs to address discrimination against "Other
Backward Classes," many of which would be Shudra subcastes. OBCs,
therefore, consist of subcastes considered socially and educationally back-
wards, but not perceived to be Schedule Castes or Scheduled Tribes.83
It is important to understand that while Shudras were victimized by
the Hindu caste system, they fared far better than Dalits who were actu-
ally outside of the caste system. In a society where the hierarchy is struc-
tured on the concept of religious purity, Dalit status has historically been
associated with occupations regarded as ritually impure. Caste Hindus
segregated Dalits from full participation in Hindu religious, social, eco-
nomic and political life. Not only did Caste Hindus prevent Dalits from
entering the premises of Hindu temples or drawing water from drinking
wells, but they also observed elaborate precautions to prevent incidental
contact with Dalits.84
79. See, e.g., G.S. GHURYE, CASTE AND CLASS IN INDIA 27 (1960); J.H. HUTTON, CASTE IN
INDIA 2 (1961).
80. NESIAH, supra note 77, at 37.
81. Id.
82. See L. DUMONT, HOMO HIERARCHIES: THE CASTE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 45
(1972); N.K. BOSE, THE STRUCTURE OF HINDU SOCIETY 28 (1975).
83. Schedule Tribes or adivasis comprise 8.2% of India's population, or 84 million peo-
ple. Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes Population, Census of India, available at
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/CensusData_2001 /India-at-glance/scst.aspx
(last visited Mar. 22, 2008). They live and draw sustenance from forests. Both com-
mercial forestry and intensive agriculture have destroyed their way of life, and ren-
dered them disadvantaged as a group. See TRIBAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA: THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (Govinda Chandra Rath ed., 2006). The Indian government
officially recognizes these groups as "Scheduled Tribes." They are often grouped
together with Dalits in the category "Scheduled Castes and Tribes" in the Constitu-
tion of India. They enjoy the same affirmative action benefits as do Scheduled
Castes. See articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. Articles 340 and 341
are also identical to each other.
84. See NESIAH, supra note 77, at 38.
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Mughal rule (established by Islamic invaders who ruled India from
1526 until the eighteenth century) generally did not change the social
fabric or alter entrenched inequality with respect to Dalits. While Mughal
rule primarily respected the hierarchical status quo, during British rule,
Dalits were viewed as a political group for the first time,85 primarily as a
result of a larger struggle for self-rule waged by nationalist Indians. The
early part of the twentieth century saw a flurry of activity by the British
government to assess the feasibility of responsible self-government in In-
dia. Upper caste Indian elites led the movement for self-rule. Although
they took their own social superiority for granted, these elites found their
Hindu traditions viewed as backwards from the western prism of indi-
vidualism and self-determination.86 In response, they started to consider
restructuring India into a society that respected individualism and self-
determination, and they began to demand the corresponding individual
rights.87 The British, however, continued to view India as made up of dis-
crete groups whose interests were fundamentally opposed to each other.88
This disjuncture between a British construction of India as essentially
group-based and the growing aspiration of the Indian elite that national
unity and individual rights supersede 'traditional' social groupings gave
rise to the biggest paradox of the nationalist movement. The British
viewed India as a collection of discrete groups, while the upper caste
Hindu supporters of self-rule embraced western individualism. The Brit-
ish perspective found support among several minority and oppressed
groups in Indian society. For instance, Dalits did not need individual
rights, Ambedkar argued, but group-based protection from continued op-
pression. 9 The Maharaja of Kolhapur also aggressively promoted the
causes of the other "depressed classes."90 He demanded special represen-
tation for them in local and legislative bodies and led a protest march
preceding the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms.91
In 1935, the British passed the Government of India Act, designed to
give Indian provinces greater self-rule and set up a national federal struc-
ture. The British incorporated reservation of seats for the "Depressed
85. V.B. Rawat, Dalit movements at the Crossroads, CROSSCURRENTS.ORG, Aug. 9, 2005, at
http://www.countercurrents.org/dalit-rawat090805.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
86. B. Sivaramayya, Equality and Inequality: the Legal Framework in EQUALITY AND INE-
QUALITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 48 (1983).
87. Id.
88. SUNITA PARIKH, THE POLITICS OF PREFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND AFFIRM-
ATIVE ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA 52 (1997).
89. LAURA DUDLEY JENKINS, IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION IN INDIA: DEFINING THE DISAD-
VANTAGED 130 (2003).
90. See generally Ian Copland, The Maharaja of Kolhapur and the Non-Brahmin Movement,
1902-10, 7 MODERN ASIAN STUDIES 209-25 (April 1973).
91. Id. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were the first serious attempt by the British
to introduce gradual self governance in India. An additional feature was the protec-
tion of minorities, and there was controversy as to what form the protection of caste
minorities such as Dalits would take. The Montagu-Chelmsford report formed the
basis for the Government of India Act, 1919. Modification to this Act was made in
the Government of India Act, 1935, which served as the basis upon which the Con-
stitution of Independent India was modeled.
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Classes" (including Dalits) into the Act, which went into force in 1937.92
The Act brought the term "Scheduled Castes" into use. However, the leg-
islative framework for reservations in higher education did not exist until
the ratification of the Constitution in 1950.
If the inconsistency between the United States commitment to equality
and its treatment of blacks is the American dilemma, "the reconciliation
of traditional hierarchical concepts of [Indian] society with constitutional
provisions for equality" is the Indian dilemma.93 Sociologist Andr6
B~teille has termed this conflict "between legal order with its commit-
ment to complete equality and the social order with its all pervasive strat-
ification . . . the most manifest contradiction in everyday life in
contemporary India."94 The deliberations of the founding fathers of the
Indian Constitution provide a glimpse into this dilemma.
The chair of the drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly was
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.95 Even though Ambedkar was the chair, a consensual
and deliberative process involving all the members of the Constituent As-
sembly framed the Indian Constitution.96 Within each province, members
were elected by legislators belonging to religious categories of Hindu (or
'general'), Muslim and Sikh.97 The number of seats in each religious cate-
gory was based upon its percentage of the population in that particular
province as determined by the British census of 1932.98 Caste, however,
was not taken into consideration when reserving seats for the Constituent
Assembly.
The dominant political party in India at the time was the Congress
party of Mahatma Ghandi and Jawalahara Nehru.99 There were no 'caste'
92. Government of India Act, s. 305 (1935).
93. PARIKH, supra note 88, at 47.
94. Sivaramayya, supra note 86, at 84.
95. Constituent Assembly, at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/facts.htm
(last visited Oct. 23, 2007).
96. Id. Just prior to Independence in 1947, British India was divided into three adminis-
trative units: (1) States ruled directly by the British, and having a common provin-
cial legislative structure; (2) Baluchistan, which was termed the Chief
Commissioners Provinces; and (3) Princely States, who were de jure 'protectorates'
of the British, through de facto control by them. Id. Members of the Constituent
Assembly came from these three separate administrative units: (1) 292 members
were elected through the Provincial Legislative Assemblies; (2) four members repre-
sented Baluchistan; and (3) 93 members represented the Indian Princely States. Id.
In the category of seats elected by the Provincial Legislative Assemblies, the Muslim
League claimed 73 of the 78 Muslim seats, the Panthic Akalis claimed three of the
four Sikh seats, and the Congress Party claimed 202 of the 210 'general' seats. Id.
While the original number of members to the Constituent Assembly was set at 389,
the decision to partition India reduced the number to 299. Id. The reduction of 90
members came by reducing the numbers elected by the Provincial Legislative As-
semblies in the Muslim-majority Northwest India (which became West Pakistan and
is now the country of Pakistan) and Northeast India (which became East Pakistan
and is now the country of Bangladesh). Id. Under the Mountbatten Plan of June 3,
1947, a separate Constituent Assembly was set up for Pakistan and representatives
of some Provinces ceased to be members of the Assembly. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See generally STANLEY A. KOCHANEK, THE CONGRESS PARTY OF INDIA: THE DYNAMICS
OF ONE-PARTY DEMOCRACY (1969).
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sub-categories within the Hindu or general seats and, thus, no reserva-
tions for Dalits.100 The Congress leadership, however, sought to ensure
adequate representation of minority groups such as Dalits in the 'general'
category.101 Representatives of minority groups constituted about 37.5%
of the post-partition Constituent Assembly, reflecting the makeup of In-
dian society.102 Among the Dalits included by Congress was Dr.
Ambedkar. Most other Dalit members were from the Scheduled Caste
Federation founded in 1942 by Ambedkar to fight for the rights of the
Dalit community. The only reservations framers of the Indian Constitu-
tion permitted in the Constitution were for Schedule Castes and Schedule
Tribes, for whom there had been no reservations in the Constituent As-
sembly itself.103 However, the Constitution also included a special provi-
sion allowing the State to make provisions for the advancement of other
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens.104
As mentioned earlier, the Indian elite were strongly in favor of indi-
vidual rights. But the Indian Constitution also had to resolve the conflict-
ing interests of different caste and religious groups. The Constitution
recognized the dilemma between group and individual rights and sought
to resolve this fundamental conflict by accepting the importance of group
life and seeking to enhance India's rich plural diversity, but within a
framework of social reform and protection of individual rights. First, the
framers prohibited discrimination on grounds of group association or af-
filiation including sex, caste, race, place of birth, residence or religion.105
Second, the framers sought to protect, nurture, and advance the claims of
traditional group life, especially those founded on religious beliefs and
practices, social and cultural life, and language.06 Third, the framers pro-
vided that group life would yield to the reasonable demands of public
order, health, and morality and co-exist with India's general commitment
100. Ramnarayan S. Rawat, Making Claims for Power: A New Agenda in Dalit Politics of
Uttar Pradesh, 1946-48, http://www.sephis.org/pdf/rawatcambridge.pdf.
101. Id.
102. "[Alccording to the 1951 census 37.8% of the population were either non-Hindu or
belonged to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes." James Chiriyankandath, Constitu-
tional Predilections, http://www.india-seminar.com/1999/484/484%20chiriyan-
kandath.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
103. Rawat, supra note 100.
104. INDIA CONST. art. 15, cl. 4.
105. INDIA CONST. art. 15, cl. 1.
106. The Indian Constitution stresses fundamental rights, asserts equality before the law,
prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth,
and guarantees the right to reside in any part of the territory of India. Collective
rights are also specifically supported in the Constitution under Article 17, which
abolishes untouchability, and under Article 15 cl. 4, which enables the State to make
special provisions for the "advancement of any socially and educationally back-
ward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes." The
provisions on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes identify certain categories of
peoples collectively and provide them with institutional protections to ensure them
fair representation. Article 19(e) implies that indigenous peoples, peasants or other
groups strongly tied to their land may remain on their land. In terms of interna-
tional law, India has also ratified the principal human rights treaties which have
provisions guaranteeing collective and group rights.
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to social welfare and reform.107 The fourth response to the conflicting in-
terests was to create a just uniform civil code for personal laws that
would resolve emerging controversies including the opening of
temples.108
The framers of the Indian Constitution saw the importance of individ-
ual equality and anti-discrimination provisions and reiterated this in sev-
eral provisions of the Constitution. However, the framers also realized
that mere anti-discrimination provisions could only guarantee a formal
equality that would not be effective in combating the historically en-
trenched inequality. Resources are unequally distributed, and social cus-
toms are set in a hierarchical mode. The "right to equality, whether equal
protection of the laws or equality of opportunity, would have little secur-
ity without important changes in the [social] structure of [Indian] soci-
ety."109 The framers thus saw the need for "special provisions," or
"affirmative action" for groups for whom mere anti-discrimination laws
would not obliterate disadvantages caused by long histories of oppres-
sion.U10 The Constitution explicitly identifies the groups eligible for reser-
vations,"' including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and OBCs.112
While the office of the President of India is largely ceremonial, Article
341(1) gave the President of India the initial power to determine which
castes, or parts of castes, would constitute 'Scheduled Castes.'13 Until the
Indian Supreme Court decision in 1973,114 it was thought that only Parlia-
ment had the power to modify this list.115
Article 15(1) of the Indian Constitution specifically bars the state from
discriminating against any citizen based upon race, caste, sex or place of
birth. Like interpretations of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause,
this provision is limited to state actors and therefore does not apply to
private parties.116 In 1951, Article 15(4) was added to the Constitution. It
provides that "[n]othing in this article . . . shall prevent the State from
107. INDIA CONST. art. 25, cl. 2.
108. INDIA CONST. art. 17 (prohibition of untouchability); INDIA CONST. art. 44 (securing a
uniform civil code); and INDIA CONST. art. 48 (ban on cow slaughter).
109. ANDRt BtTEILLE, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN INDIA: ESSAYS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVE (1991).
110. Id.
111. INDIA CONST. arts. 341-42.
112. INDIA CONST. art. 15, cls. 3 and 4.
113. INDIA CONST. art. 341, cl. 1 (stating that "The President may with respect to any
State or Union territory, and where it is a State, after consultation with the Governor
thereof, by public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups
within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be
deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the
case may be").
114. Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (India Supreme
Court, 1973).
115. INDIA CONST. art. 341, cl. 2 (stating that "Parliament may by law include in or ex-
clude from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued under
clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or tribe,
but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied
by any subsequent notification").
116. The word 'state' is broadly construed, and includes not only the federal and state
legislature/executive, but any body that is controlled by them.
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making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens [OBCs] or for the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes."117 The phrase "making any special pro-
vision" is an open-ended phrase that allows the government to provide
an array of facilities for promoting the interests of Schedule Castes and
Scheduled Tribes.118 The Indian Supreme Court has upheld Article 15(4).119
117. INDIA CONST. art. 15, cl. 4. The Indian Constitution also included a special provision
for the appointment of a Commission to investigate the conditions of socially and
educationally backward classes other than Dalits and Scheduled Tribes. INDIA
CONST. art. 340. This provision would eventually lead to reservations for OBCs,
which has remained controversial in India to this day. For a discussion of the estab-
lishment of the first commission established under Article 340 and what happened
in its aftermath, see MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACK-
WARD CLASSES IN INDIA 186-87 (1984). OBCs are generally low caste Hindus or
Shudras. Eventually a commission chaired by a low caste Hindu member of Parlia-
ment, B.P. Mandal, was created. The Mandal Commission delivered recommenda-
tions on December 31, 1980 determining which other subcastes were socially and
educationally backwards and recommending policies for their improvement. For a
discussion of criteria used to determine which subcastes were socially and educa-
tionally backwards, see E.J. Prior, Constitutional Fairness or Fraud on the Constitution?:
Compensatory Discrimination in India, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LAW 63, 83-84 (1996).
The Commission noted that 22.5% of the Indian population was either Dalits or
Scheduled Tribes and thus 22.5% of the government jobs had already been reserved
on their behalf. Even though OBCs constituted 52% of the population, a prior Indian
Supreme Court opinion had limited the maximum percentage of reservations to
50%. See Balaji v. State of Mysore, 50 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649, 663 (India 1963) (holding
that the total percentage of reservations permissible under Article 15(4) of the In-
dian Constitution should generally be less than 50%). See also Rajkumar v. Gulbarga
University, 77 A.I.R. 1990 (Kant.) 320, 332 (1990) (following the 50% limit for reser-
vations). Thus, the Commission's recommendations limited the reservations for
government positions and admissions to higher education to 27% for the groups
that it had defined as OBCs. The report went on to recommend that OBCs who
obtained their public employment through open competition not count against the
27% reservation. Reservations should apply to promotions as well as initial employ-
ment. The reservations would also apply to all private sector organizations that are
recipients of government financial assistance as well as all universities and colleges.
Though the report was accepted, the recommendations were largely ignored.
In 1989, the coalition government of V.P. Singh came to power after defeating
Indira Gandhi's son, Rajiv Gandhi, and his Congress party. On August 7, 1990,
Singh announced that he had accepted the Mandal Commission report and would
immediately begin implementation of the reservations for OBCs at the national
level. The decision by Singh to implement the Mandal Commission report set off a
firestorm of protests across India. It eventually contributed to the collapse of his
coalition government. In 1993, the Supreme Court upheld the recommendations as
constitutional in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 447 (India Su-
preme Court, 1993). Then Prime Minister, Narasinha Rao, announced his intention
to comply with the Supreme Court's opinion and to implement the recommenda-
tions contained in the Mandal Commission report as soon as was practical.
118. India has chosen to have a quota-based system, but there exist other permissible
possibilities that the Indian state has not explored. Article 15(4) also allowed the
State to make provisions for socially and educationally backwards classes other
than OBCs.
119. The Indian Constitution is far easier to amend than the U.S. Constitution. All it
takes to amend the Indian Constitution in most cases is a quorum of more than half
of the members of each house in Parliament, and a two-thirds majority vote. How-
ever, the Indian Supreme Court has created a doctrine that limits the type of
amendments that are possible. According to the Indian Supreme Court, no govern-
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Ratification of the Indian Constitution in 1950 marks the watershed
moment for their legal rights. With the ratification of the Constitution,
Indian society formally recognized the need to address the historic op-
pression of many groups, including the Dalits, a need that had plagued
Indian society for thousands of years.
II. IMPACTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND FEDERAL ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAW ON AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN HIGHER
EDUCATION
This section will discuss four aspects of constitutional law and federal
anti-discrimination law in the context of higher education opportunities
for African-Americans. First, it will cover the development of the legal
regime that prohibits colleges and universities that had remained all-
white through the segregation era from continuing to refuse to admit
black students. Second, we will consider whether affirmative action
amounts to "special considerations" in the admissions process of selec-
tive colleges and universities. The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed af-
firmative action admissions policies in the 1978 case of Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.120 Justice Powell's controlling opinion for
the Court rejected quotas or reservations of college admissions seats, but
agreed that race could be used as a positive factor for blacks and other
minorities in an individualized admissions process.121 The Supreme Court
reaffirmed Justice Powell's opinion in 2003 in the University of Michigan
cases, Grutter v. Bollinger122 and Gratz v. Bollinger.23 Third, we will con-
sider the benefits of private and publicly funded historically black col-
leges and universities (HBCUs). Created during the segregation era,
HBCUs remain a viable opportunity for black students and professors in
higher education. Fourth, we will consider the impact of the diversifying
racial/ethnic make-up of black students benefitting from affirmative ac-
tion policies.
A. Non-discrimination in College and University Admissions
Opportunities for African-Americans to pursue higher education in
the South in 1940 were grossly limited. Segregation laws generally
banned them from white universities and black universities were inferior
ment action - whether constitutional amendment, legislation or executive action -
can violate the core or 'basic structure' of the Constitution. Keshavananda Bharati v.
State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (India Supreme Court, 1973). As a result,
amendments to the Constitution can be challenged as violating the core or basic
structure of the Constitution.
Article 15(4) was inserted into the Indian Constitution in 1951, in response to the
Indian Supreme Court holding in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, A.I.R.
1951 S.C. 226 (India Supreme Court, 1951), which had held affirmative action to be
invalid under the equality clause in article Article 15(1). Article 15(4) has been up-
held in several cases, most notably Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993
S.C. 447 (India Supreme Court, 1993).
120. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
121. Id.
122. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
123. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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in terms of curricular offerings, library materials, qualifications of faculty
and physical accomodations. Discrimination was even greater at the
graduate and professional school level. In 1940 only three of the seven-
teen segregationist states124 - Virginia, Texas and North Carolina - of-
fered graduate-level instruction at their HBCUs.125 In addition, none of
the approximately thirty HBCUs in the segregationist states offered any
Ph.D. granting programs, and only two had professional schools.126 One
was the North Carolina College for Negroes, which had two programs:
law school and library science.127 The other professional school was the
124. Seventeen states and the District of Columbia were collectively referred to as the
"segregationist states" because they maintained a rigid form of segregation. Gil
Kujovich, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black Public College: The Era of
Separate But Equal, 72 MINN. L. REV. 29, 30 n.1 (1987). Eleven were part of the Con-
federacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Id. Four of the segregationist
states were the Border States during the Civil War: Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland,
and Missouri. Id. At the time of the Civil War, slavery was legal in these states
however, they refused to secede from the Union. West Virginia, which was carved
out of Virginia during the Civil War, was the 16th state and Oklahoma was the 17th
state. Id.
125. Kujovich, supra note 124, at 113.
126. The black professional schools were North Carolina College for Negroes School of
Law and Library Science and Lincoln University Law School in Missouri. Id. at 113
n.303. The law school at Lincoln University was actually the result of the NAACP's
litigation success in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The all-
white University of Missouri Law School had refused to admit Lloyd Lionel Gaines
because of his race. State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783, 784-85 (Mo. 1937),
rev'd, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The State of Missouri offered to pay Gaines's extra ex-
penses for a legal education in an out-of-state law school or, alternatively, to build a
law school for African-Americans at Lincoln University, the black public college. Id.
at 786. The Missouri Supreme Court found that the scholarship program was sub-
stantially equal to the opportunity offered white students at the University of Mis-
souri and rejected Gaines's challenge. Id. at 790.
In reversing, the Supreme Court noted that the validity of segregation laws
"rest[ed] wholly upon the equality of the privileges which the laws give to the sepa-
rated groups within the State." Gaines, 305 U.S. at 349. While law schools in other
states might have been every bit as good as that of the University of Missouri, the
relevant question was what kind of opportunity the state of Missouri provided for
the two racial groups. Missouri had given a privilege to whites, that of attending the
University of Missouri Law School within the state, that it had not given to African-
Americans. The Supreme Court ruled that Gaines "was entitled to be admitted to
the law school of the State University in the absence of other and proper provision
for his legal training within the State." Id. at 352. Gaines never actually enrolled in
the University of Missouri Law School. DIANE RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE:
AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1945-1980, at 122 (1983). Therefore, we do not know what
reaction his enrollment would have provoked. After the decision by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, the Missouri legislature established a law school for African-Ameri-
cans at Lincoln University. State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 131 S.W.2d 217, 218-19
(Mo. 1939). The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that as long as the facilities at Lin-
coln University were "substantially equivalent" to those at the University of Mis-
souri, the absence of other and proper provision for Gaines had been redressed,
thus he had no right to attend the University of Missouri. Id. at 220. The NAACP
was unable to locate Gaines in order to challenge this action by Missouri. See Lucile
H. Bluford, The Lloyd Gaines Story, 32 J. EDUC. Soc. 242, 244-46 (1959).
127. See supra note 126.
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recently-created law school at Lincoln University in Missouri.128 In con-
trast, all seventeen segregationist states had white public colleges with
extensive graduate and professional school programs. The number of dif-
ferent professional degrees offered at white public colleges was as fol-
lows: graduate engineering - 17, law - 16, medicine - 15, graduate
commerce and business - 15, pharmacy - 14, library science - 11, social
service - 9, and dentistry - 4.129
Between 1938 and 1950, the United States Supreme Court addressed
four cases dealing with segregation in graduate and professional schools,
establishing the principle that graduate and professional schools could
not refuse to admit students solely on the basis of race. 130 The Court
quickly applied its unanimous 1954 opinion invalidating segregation in
primary and secondary public education in Brown v. Board of Education to
higher education generally.131
It took some time before state officials and administrators at white
public colleges, universities and graduate programs began to dismantle
their segregated student bodies and faculties. Nevertheless, the legal
foundation had been laid. Private colleges and universities, however,
were not subject to the anti-discrimination law until the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the most sweeping civil rights legislation in the history of the
United States, was enacted. Title VI of the Act banned discrimination in
all federally aided programs.132 Since private colleges and universities re-
ceived federal funds, Title VI applied to them. The potential sanction of a
cutoff of federal funds was enough to compel private higher education
institutions to end their discriminatory practices against blacks.133
B. Affirmative Action in Higher Education
In the 1960s, public and private colleges and universities began to es-
tablish special admissions programs in order to increase the number of
black students. Until the 1970s, the U.S. generally considered itself a
black/white nation. According to the 2000 census, blacks comprise 12.3%
of the population, Hispanics 12.5% and Asians 3.6%.134 But the Census
Bureau's population statistics in 1970 revealed that blacks and whites
128. Id.
129. Gil Kujovich, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black Public College: The
Era of Separate But Equal, 72 MINN. L. REV. 29, 113 n.303 (1987).
130. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla. State, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950);
McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
131. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956) (finding segre-
gation unconstitutional in graduate schools).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance.").
133. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (from the
Civil Rights Act of 1866) prohibits private schools from excluding blacks from ad-
missions based solely on race, regardless of federal funding).
134. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table 1: Population by Race, for Hispanic or Latino
Origin for all Ages and for 18 years and older for the United States 2000 (Apr. 2,
2001).
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comprised 98.5% of Americans.135 Thus, during the time that colleges and
universities began instituting affirmative action admissions policies, the
dominant racial/ethnic paradigm was black/white, and affirmative ac-
tion was intended to benefit black students.
While the special admissions programs of some colleges and universi-
ties limited their consideration of race to one of many factors in an indi-
vidualized admissions decision process, others actually reserved a certain
percentage of admissions seats for disadvantaged minorities, including
blacks. For the latter group, admitting blacks (and other minorities) was
part of an entirely separate process. The United States Supreme Court
addressed one of these admission plans in 1978 in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke.136
The Medical School of the University of California at Davis rejected
Alan Bakke's application for admission.137 In response, Bakke-a white
male--sued in federal court.138 Bakke alleged that the school's special ad-
missions program-under which 16 of the 100 positions in the class were
reserved for economically or educationally disadvantaged applicants-vi-
olated both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act.139 The Medical School viewed members of African-American, Chi-
cano, Asian, or Native American heritage as exclusively fitting the
description of disadvantaged applicants, and evaluated applicants from
those groups in a separate admissions process from the regular process. 140
The Medical School argued that the Equal Protection Clause should
apply differently depending on the race of the person raising such a
claim. Strict scrutiny should be limited to challenges of governmental ac-
tions that would serve to disadvantage discrete and insular minorities.141
Since the special admissions plan did not disadvantage any discrete and
insular minority groups, the Court should accord greater deference to the
decision of the University to adopt such a plan. Four of the justices agreed
with the University and were prepared to uphold the special admissions
program, with its reservations for minorities.142 These justices saw Bakke's
Title VI claim as coextensive with his equal protection claim.143 Thus, for
these justices the reservation of admissions seats did not violate either
Title VI or the Equal Protection Clause. Four other justices, however, did
not address the equal protection claim.'44 Instead, they were prepared to
strike down the special admissions program as a violation of Title VI,
135. STEPHAN THERNSTROM, THE DEMOGRAPHY OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS 12-13
(2001).
136. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
137. Id. at 276.
138. Id. at 277.
139. Id. at 278.
140. Id. at 274.
141. Id. at 288. The petitioners were relying upon the statement by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
142. 438 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 352.
144. Id. at 409 (Stevens, J., Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., & Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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without reaching the constitutional claim.145 These justices interpreted Ti-
tle VI's ban on discrimination in federally funded programs to apply re-
gardless of the race of the presumed beneficiaries.146 For them, not only
were reservations illegal, but any consideration of race in the admissions
process violated the non-discriminatory provision of Title VI. One of the
most extraordinary opinions in U.S. constitutional history, the controlling
opinion in Bakke, was authored by a single person-Justice Lewis Powell.
Before Powell addressed the special admissions program, he resolved
two preliminary issues. First, he agreed with the first set of four justices'
conclusion that Title VI only banned discrimination also prohibited by the
Equal Protection Clause.147 Thus, his opinion resolved the issues of reser-
vations and considerations of race in an individualized admissions pro-
cess under both Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause. The second
preliminary issue related to the controlling purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Powell noted that "the perception of racial and ethnic dis-
tinctions is rooted in" the nation's constitutional history.148 Quoting from
the Slaughter-House Cases, Powell candidly admitted that the "pervading
purpose" of the Fourteenth Amendment was "the freedom of the slave
race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protec-
tion of the newly-made freedmen and citizen" from oppression.149 Ac-
cording to Powell, however, post-Civil War judicial reaction "virtually
strangled" this pervading purpose in its infancy and relegated it to de-
cades of relative obscurity.150 Between the time that the original purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was strangled and new life was breathed
into it, the country had become a "nation of minorities[,] each hav[ing] to
struggle-and to some extent struggles still-to overcome the prejudices"
of a majority.151 Powell went on to write:
It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to
all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a
degree of protection greater than that accorded others .... Once
the artificial line of a "two-class theory" of the Fourteenth
Amendment is put aside, the difficulties entailed in varying the
level of judicial review according to a perceived "preferred" sta-
tus of a particular racial or ethnic minority are intractable.152
Concluding that the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment must
therefore extend to all persons, Powell asserted that the Equal Protection
Clause could not mean one thing when applied to one race and some-
thing else when applied to another.153
Powell, however, decided that under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, public colleges and universities had a right of academic
145. Id. at 421.
146. Id. at 412.
147. Id. at 287.
148. 438 U.S. at 291.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 292.
152. Id. at 295.
153. 438 U.S. at 296-97.
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freedom that allows them to determine their appropriate student body.154
Thus, Bakke's assertion that any consideration of race violates his equal
protection right must be weighed against the University's countervailing
constitutional right to determine its own student body.
In balancing Bakke's equal protection rights with U.C. Davis's rights
of academic freedom, Powell concluded that protecting the rights of indi-
viduals required the rejection of quotas that reserved a certain percentage
of spaces for disadvantaged minorities. 155 However, if the purpose of con-
sidering race is to achieve the benefits that come from enrolling a diverse
student body, then colleges and universities can use race as a plus factor
in an individualized admissions process.156 Powell was clear that the pur-
pose of considering race is not to compensate disadvantaged minorities
for past injustices, to recognize the present effects of those past injustices,
or to take account of current injustices or under-representation.1S7 Thus,
while colleges and universities-public and private-could not reserve
spaces for blacks, they could use race as a plus factor in an effort to obtain
the benefits that flow from having a larger percentage of students from
African-American and other ethnicities.
In the summer of 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down two
opinions dealing with the issue of affirmative action in higher education.
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law
School's affirmative action plan, permitting racial classifications to be in-
cluded in an individualized admissions process as a means to pursue a
critical mass of minority students from groups with a history of discrimi-
nation that would otherwise not be represented in significant numbers.158
The Court, however, struck down an affirmative action admissions plan
adopted by the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science,
and the Arts in Gratz v. Bollinger that determined admissions on a point-
allocation system.1 59 Applicants received points based on their academic
performance including high school grade point average and standardized
test scores.60 They also received points based on certain characteristics
including being a member of an under-represented minority group.161 The
Supreme Court rejected the affirmative action plan presented in Gratz be-
cause it did not provide for the individualized and holistic consideration
process that must be the core of a race-conscious admissions policy.62
However, instituting such an involved admissions process can substan-
tially increase the administrative burden of institutions seeking to imple-
ment affirmative action policies.
In Grutter, Justice O'Connor wrote for the five person majority that
strongly reaffirmed Justice Powell's 1978 opinion in Bakke.163 As Justice
154. Id. at 312.
155. Id. at 289.
156. Id. at 317.
157. Id. at 307-10.
158. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
159. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
160. Id. at 255.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 271.
163. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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Powell did before her, O'Connor rested her opinion on a willingness to
defer to the Law School's pedagogical judgment that "diversity is essen-
tial to its academic mission."164 O'Connor noted that the benefits of enroll-
ing a critical mass of underrepresented minority students with a history
of discrimination are substantial:
[T]he Law School's admission policy promotes cross-racial under-
standing, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables stu-
dents to better understand persons of different races. These
benefits are important and laudable, because classroom discussion
is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and inter-
esting when the students have the greatest possible variety of
backgrounds.165
Justice O'Connor notes that the University did not "premise its need for
critical mass on any belief that minority students always (or even consist-
ently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue ....
Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional
experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too [will] one's
own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society... [where]
race unfortunately still matters" affect a person's views.166
Justice O'Connor goes on to assert that the Law School's claim of a
compelling interest is further bolstered by numerous expert studies and
reports showing that student body diversity promotes learning and "bet-
ter prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society,
and better prepares them as professionals."167 Justice O'Connor then notes
additional benefits that flow from diverse student bodies not directly re-
lated to improvements in the academic environment. Major American
businesses, who also filed an amicus brief in the case, made it clear that
developing "the skills needed in today's increasingly global market-
place" requires "exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints."168 Relying on a brief filed by high-ranking retired officers
and civilian leaders of the military, Justice O'Connor noted that a "highly
qualified, racially diverse officer corps is essential to the military's ability
to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security."169 At present,
the military simply cannot achieve the twin goals of an officer corps that
is both highly qualified and racially diverse without using limited race-
conscious recruiting and admissions policies in the service academies and
the ROTC.170 Finally Justice O'Connor noted that "universities, and in par-
ticular, law schools, represent the training ground for a large number of
our Nation's leaders.' 171 She goes on to state:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of
the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly
164. Id. at 328.
165. Id. at 330 (quoting Appellant's Petition for Certiorari at 244a, 246a).
166. Id. at 333.
167. Id. at 330.
168. Id.
169. 539 U.S. at 331.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 333.
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open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have
confidence in the openness and integrity of the education institu-
tions that provide this training.... Access to legal education (and
thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of talented and quali-
fied individuals of every race and ethnicity.172
C. Anti-Discrimination Law and Publicly Funded HBCUs
A key component of progress of African-Americans in anti-discrimi-
nation law and constitutional rights in education is the development of
HBCUs. The pervasive segregation that African-Americans experienced
before the 1950s left its mark on their access to higher education.173
Blacks--and white supporters of their cause-worked within the con-
straints of segregation to create a parallel education system from primary
school to higher education, the remnants of which continues to exist to-
day. There are currently over 100 HBCUs located in 20 states, Washington
D.C., and the Virgin Islands.174 These include 41 public four-year, 11 pub-
lic two-year, 49 private four-year, and 4 private 2-year institutions.175 The
172. Id. at 332.
173. With the exception of two colleges chartered for free Blacks in Pennsylvania and
Ohio, most Black colleges were founded in the South between the late 1860s and
early 1900s. See Kitty Cunningham, Are Black Public Colleges Turning White?, BLACK
ENTERPRISE, Aug. 1993, at 29.
174. President's Board of Advisors on Historically Black Colleges and Universities, The
Mission Continues: Annual Report to the President on the Results of Participation
of Historically Black Colleges and Universities in Federal Programs, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., 41-43 app. F (2002-03), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/inits/list/
whhbcu/edlite-news.html.
175. Id. An HBCU is any "college or university that was established prior to 1964, whose
principal mission was, and is, the education of Black Americans." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1061(2) (2000). Six-year graduation rates of selected HBCUs compiled by Black
Excel created from 2002 data presented in the US. News & World Report "America's
Best College" edition (2004) for all colleges is the following: Spelman College (GA)
76%; Claflin University (SC) 75%; Miles College (AL) 69%; Fisk University (TN)
62%; Lane College (TN) 61%; Morehouse College (GA) 58%; Voorhees College (SC)
56%; Tougaloo College (MS) 55%; Hampton University (VA) 53%; Howard Univer-
sity (DC) 53%; Xavier University of Louisiana (LA) 52%; Tuskegee University (AL)
51%; South Carolina State University (SC) 51%; Elizabeth City State University (NC)
51%; North Carolina Central University (NC) 46%; Winston-Salem State University
44%; Florida A&M University (FL) 43%; North Carolina A&T State University (NC)
43%; Johnson C. Smith University (NC) 41%; Lincoln University (PA) 40%; Morgan
State University (MD) 39%; Bowie State University (MD) 38%; University of Mary-
land at Eastern Shore (MD) 37%; Virginia State University (VA) 36%; Dillard Uni-
versity (LA) 36%; Bowie State University (MD) 36%; Bennett College (NC) 36%;
Jackson State University (MS) 35%; Bethune-Cookman (FL) 34%; Grambling State
University (LA) 31%; Shaw University (NC) 31%; Prairie View A&M University
(TX) 31%; Cheyney University of Pennsylvania (PA) 30%; Delaware State University
(DE) 30%; Albany State University (GA) 28%; Clark Atlanta University (GA) 27%;
Benedict College (SC) 27%; Coppin State University (MD) 24%; Norfolk State Uni-
versity (VA) 23%; Alabama State University (AL) 23%; Morris Brown College (GA)
23%; Central State University (OH) 22%; Virginia Union Universuty (VA) 21%; and
the University of the District of Columbia (DC) 20%. See Theodore Cross, The Persist-
ing Racial Gap in College Student Graduation Rates, 45 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 77
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majority of the states with HBCUs are in the South where the culture of
segregation made segregated higher education mandatory before 1954.
These institutions have always been important for the education of
black Americans. During the 1999-2000 academic year, some 24% of
blacks who earned four year baccalaureate degrees received them at
HBCUs.176 They also matriculated about 24% of the blacks enrolled in four
year programs.177 HBCUs granted approximately one in six masters de-
grees and first-professional degrees earned by African-American men
and women.178 HBCUs historically accounted for the majority of black
professionals. For example, by the early 1990s these institutions had pro-
duced almost
40[%] of America's black college graduates . . . [,] 80[%] of black
federal judges, 85[%] of all black doctors, 75[%] of all black
Ph.D.s., 50[%] of black engineers, and 46[%] of all black business
professionals .... Moreover, historically black health-profession
schools have trained an estimated 40[%] of black physicians, 75[%]
of black veterinarians, 50[%] of black pharmacists, and 40[%] of
the nation's black dentists.179
These institutions are vestiges of segregation, but they are also symbols of
self-help.
Though operation of private HBCUs is determined by the private sec-
tor, they are subject to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as are
predominantly white institutions. As a result, HBCUs cannot discrimi-
nate against white students. However, banning whites from private
HBCUs was seldom an issue. Cultural mores and prejudice kept whites
from attending these institutions. Those same mores and prejudices con-
tinue to keep the percentage of whites choosing to attend private HBCUs
relatively low and private HBCUs denying white students admissions be-
cause of their race is rarely a legal issue.
Since public HBCUs are products of government decision-making,
their existence is the result of the political process.180 When discussions
about public HBCUs normally occur it is clear that they are sources of
deep conflicts in the black community. On the one hand, there is the rec-
ognition that the creation and current shortcomings of these institutions is
(2004) (presenting tabulated graduation data for black students at HBCUs and PWIs
for 2003).
176. White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities, http://




179. David H. Jackson, Jr., Attracting and Retaining African-American Faculty at HBCUs,
123 EDUC. 181, 182 (2002) (citations omitted); see also Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond,
Serving the Educational Interests of African American Students at Brown Plus Fifty: His-
torically Black College or University Affirmative Action Programs, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1877,
1888-92 (2004) (discussing the historical importance of HBCUs).
180. Since public HBCUs are covered by the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI they
cannot discriminate against whites in admissions.
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due to the legacy of segregation and discrimination.181 These institutions
are plagued by substandard infrastructures and dilapidated facilities and
are perpetually dealing with financial difficulties.]82 On the other hand,
these institutions are responsible for training many highly educated black
professionals and provide valuable assistance to the black community.83
When the Supreme Court struck down segregation in public primary
and secondary education in 1954, the southern states resisted. Rather than
moving to desegregate higher education, these states continued their
practice of the 1930s and 1940s of pouring money into black colleges. Seg-
regation states sought to provide legitimate higher education alternatives
181. See, e.g., Gerald A. Foster, Are Black Colleges Needed?: An At-Risk/Prescriptive Guide
(1996): CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY
240 (1998) (arguing that public HBCUs should be closed or merged with predomi-
nately white institutions); see also Sean B. Seymore, I'm Confused: How Can the Federal
Government Promote Diversity in Higher Education Yet Continue to Strengthen Histori-
cally Black Colleges?, 12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SoC. JUST. 287 (2006) (arguing that the
Federal Government should withdraw financial support of HBCUs).
182. See CYNTHIA L. JACKSON & ELEANOR F. NUNN, HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 58-60 (2003) (discussing the historical devel-
opment and current financial state of HBCUs). Also, at least ten HBCUs ceased op-
erations since the mid 1970s. These institutions include Bishop College (Tex.),
Mississippi Industrial College (Miss.), Daniel Payne College (Ala.), Lomax-Hannon
Junior College (Ala.), Natchez Junior College (Miss.), Prentiss Institute (Miss.), and
Mary Holmes College (Miss.). Id. at 59. See also Audrey Williams June, Endangered
Institutions: Morris Brown's Plight Reflects the Financial Troubles of Small, Poorly Fi-
nanced Black Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 17, 2003, at A24. It has been
reported that the total endowment of the more than one hundred HBCUs combined
is less than one-tenth of the endowment held by Harvard University. See The News
Hour with Jim Lehrer: Saving Black Colleges (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 25, 2004)
[hereinafter Saving Black Colleges], http:/ / /www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/educa-
tion/jan-june04/college_02-25.html# (examining the financial crises at HBCUs).
183. See, e.g., ALBERT L. SAMUELS, IS SEPARATE UNEQUAL? BLACK COLLEGES AND THE CHAL-
LENGE TO DESEGREGATION 68 (2004); Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness in
Higher Education: Does "Sound Educational Policy" Support the Continued Existence of
Historically Black Colleges?, 43 EMORY L.J. 1 (1994). See also Arinola 0. Adebayo, et al.,
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) as Agents of Change for the Develop-
ment of Minority Businesses, 32 J. BLACK STUD. 166 (2001) (discussing the impact of
HBCUs on black-owned businesses); Paulette V. Walker, Black Colleges Help Revive
Struggling Neighborhoods, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 13, 1997, at 22 (analyzing
the increasing cooperation between HBCUs and disadvantaged communities in
their areas); Historically Black Medical Schools: Providing Critical Health Care, Training,
and Research, EBONY, Sept. 2003, at 88 (discussing the importance of historically
black medical schools to health issues faced primarily by minorities and in black
communities); Tuskegee Helps State's Needy, JET, Jun. 2, 2003, at 23 (listing the grants
received by Tuskegee University to provide health services to the poor in Alabama).
In medicine, there is a need for medical professionals who can appreciate how cul-
tural and social factors of blacks contribute to the diseases that significantly affect
the race, like HIV/AIDS, sickle-cell anemia, and diabetes. See JACKSON & NUNN,
supra note 182, at 46. Professor Kenneth Tollett has listed seven different functions of
HBCUs: (1) admirable models for success; (2) an environment which is "psychologi-
cally and socially congenial"; (3) an "enclave" for black students to transition from
an isolated black world to white America; (4) protection against America's "declin-
ing interest in the education of blacks;" (5) societal resources for black communities;
(6) a wider freedom of choice for black and white students; and (7) preserving black
culture. Kenneth S. Tollett, Sr., The Fate of Minority-Based Institutions After Fordice: An
Essay, 13 REV. LIrrG. 447, 475-84 (1994).
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to blacks in their own schools in order to maintain the system of segre-
gated higher education. The rise of the black power movement of the
1960s was based around the assertion of black self-help and racial pride.
Thus, by the time serious legal attention was brought to bear on the issue
of the future of public HBCUs in the late 1960s, the black community was
polarized around two radically different extremes. One extreme em-
braced the statement articulated by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
of Education that "in the field of education, separate was inherently une-
qual."184 The proponents of this extreme supported complete desegrega-
tion and believed that there was no role for public HBCUs. Appropriate
solutions for public HBCUs were to attract significant numbers of white
students, merge with the state's white colleges and universities, or simply
close. Despite the decades of under funding and neglect, however, public
HBCUs had their supporters. There were many who felt that HBCUs
were a necessary aspect of the black self-help movement, because they
provided blacks with the opportunity to shape their higher education ex-
perience.185 In addition, many viewed HBCUs as a source of racial
pride.186 Others recognized that decades of inadequate primary and sec-
ondary education left too many blacks ill-prepared to attend the more
academically rigorous white colleges and universities.187 Black colleges,
however, developed programs to address the inadequate preparation of
many of their students. Regardless of the historic neglect that public
HBCUs experienced, they would still provide a significant number of
black students with their only viable option for higher education. To dis-
mantle these institutions would actually reduce opportunities for African-
Americans, rather than improve them.
Lower federal courts began to address the legal status of HBCUs as
early as 1968.188 But it wasn't until 1992 in United States v. Fordice89 that the
Supreme Court rendered its only major decision specifying the remedial
obligation of the state with regard to public HBCUs. Fordice dealt with the
higher education system operated by the State of Mississippi. By the time
litigation leading to the Supreme Court's 1992 opinion commenced, Mis-
sissippi was operating eight universities: five for whites (the University of
Mississippi, Mississippi State University, Mississippi University for Wo-
men, the University of Southern Mississippi and Delta State University)190
184. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
185. See, e.g., SAMUELS, supra note 183, at 68-72.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness in Higher Education: Does "Sound
Educational Policy" Support the Continued Existence of Historically Black Colleges?, 43
EMORY L.J. 1, 13-20 (1994) (describing minority unequal access to education).
188. See Ala. State Teachers Ass'n v. Ala. Pub. Sch. & Coll. Auth., 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D.
Ala. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 4 (1969); Norris v. State Council of Higher Ed., 327 F.
Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va 1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 907 (1971); Adams v. Richardson, 356
F. Supp. 92 (D.C.D. 1973).
189. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
190. Mississippi started its public university system in 1848 by founding the University
of Mississippi. In the statute authorizing its creation, it was designated to serve only
whites. Four more universities were created for whites: Mississippi State University
was founded in 1880, Mississippi University for Women in 1885, the University of
Southern Mississippi in 1912, and Delta State University in 1925. Id. at 721.
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and three for blacks (Alcorn State, Jackson State University and Missis-
sippi Valley State University).191 The State of Mississippi under-funded
the black public universities for decades.192 In addition, the State circum-
scribed the mission of the black universities primarily to undergraduate
training in teacher education, agricultural and mechanical professions,
and vocational training.93
It was not until 1962 that James Meredith, by enrolling at the Univer-
sity of Mississippi, broke the color barrier at any public Mississippi uni-
versity.194 When Meredith first sought to enroll in 1961, the governor of
the state, the university officials and other governmental officials all
worked to prevent it.195 Meredith's registration in 1962 caused a full-scale
riot at the University of Mississippi.196 Two men were killed, hundreds
were injured and nearly 200 people were arrested.197 By 1967, however, all
of the historically white colleges had begun admitting black students.198
The first black college to enroll a white student, Alcorn State University,
did so in 1966.199 The other two followed suit in 1969 and 1970.200 While
the black colleges in Mississippi began to hire white faculty members in
the late 1960s, the first black faculty member was not hired at any of the
white colleges until the 1970-71 academic year. 201 Mississippi State Uni-
versity, the last white college to hire a black faculty member, did not do
so until 1974-75 school year.202
In 1975, a group of black petitioners, the "Ayers plaintiffs," filed a
petition in federal court.203 Rather than seeking to desegregate the histori-
cally white institutions, the Ayers plaintiffs focused on the fact that Mis-
sissippi had systematically under-funded its black universities for
decades.204 The aim of their complaint was to significantly strengthen the
funding for, and the academic programs at, the historically black col-
191. Alcorn State was founded in 1871, Jackson State University, originally founded as a
private college for the purpose of preparing black ministers and teachers, came
under state control in 1940, and Mississippi Valley State University, which was orig-
inally called "Mississippi Vocational College" and had a mission of educating
teachers primarily for rural and elementary school and providing vocational train-
ing for blacks, came under state control in 1950. Id. at 721-22.
192. For example, in the period of 1952-54, only 15.7% of the ten million dollars that the
state spent on higher education was spent on black institutions. SAMUELS, supra note
183, at 97.
193. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 721-22.
194. University of Mississippi Libraries, Inventory of the James Howard Meredith Col-
lection (MUM00293), http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/general-library/files/





198. See Robert N. Davis, The Quest for Equal Education in Mississippi: The Implications of





203. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 723.
204. See SAMUELS, supra note 183, at 107.
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leges.205 The Ayers plaintiffs agreed that blacks needed more access to his-
torically white colleges.206 However, they also felt that in order to
preserve the education opportunities for blacks, it was necessary to
strengthen the black colleges.207 For the Ayers plaintiffs, the goal of litiga-
tion was not the merging of black colleges with white colleges that would
lead to the elimination of HBCUs.208 Rather, they viewed the obligation of
the State of Mississippi as requiring it to make sure that all of its publicly-
supported universities offered students an equal chance at a quality edu-
cation.209 As a result, Mississippi had to cure its decades of neglecting
black universities by compensating them financially and significantly
strengthening their academic programs. 210
Twelve years of negotiations failed to produce an agreement. In 1987
the case went to trial.211 During the 1985-86 academic year over 99% of
the white students attended one of the historically white universities.212
During this same academic year, 71% of the black students attended
HBCUs.213 Since its universities no longer barred black students from at-
tending white colleges or white students from attending black colleges,
however, the State of Mississippi argued that its non-discrimination ad-
missions policies satisfied its obligation to remedy its formerly segregated
public higher education system.214 The State asserted that the continued
segregation of its public universities was no longer the result of state ac-
tion, but the voluntary choices by individual students.25 In sum, the State
argued that its equal protection obligation to remedy its former unconsti-
tutional maintenance of separate black and white universities only re-
quired that it implement non-discriminatory admissions and hiring
practices.
The Supreme Court rejected the arguments by both the Ayers plain-
tiffs and the State of Mississippi, and concluded that even though the
state enacted admissions and hiring policies that were race-neutral, that
alone did not satisfy its remedial duty to desegregate its colleges and uni-
versities.26 The Court held that the remedial obligation of a state that had
formerly operated a segregated system of higher education does not dis-
charge "its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies and prac-
tices traceable to its prior de jure dual system that continue to foster
segregation."217 The Court went on to state:
If the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its prior
system that continue to have segregative effects-whether by in-
205. Id.
206. Id. at 110.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 107-08.
209. Id. at 107-10.
210. Id. at 109.
211. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 725.
212. Id. at 724.
213. Id. at 725.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 743.
217. 505 U.S. at 728.
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fluencing student enrollment decisions or by fostering segregation
in other facets of the university system-and such policies are
without sound educational justification and can be practicably
eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden of proving that it
has dismantled its prior system.218
The Court noted that the former de jure segregated system of public
universities impeded the free choice of prospective students.219 Thus, the
State of Mississippi is required to "take the necessary steps to ensure that
this choice now is truly free."220 It is with this duty in mind that the poli-
cies and practices instituted by the system of public universities in Missis-
sippi must be examined.221 Clearly, the maintenance by Mississippi of five
white universities and three black ones is traceable to the prior system of
education and has segregative effects. In addressing the question of the
continued maintenance of public HBCUs, the Court stated:
If we understand private petitioners to press us to order the up-
grading of Jackson State, Alcorn State, and Mississippi Valley State
solely so that they may be publicly financed, exclusively black en-
claves by private choice, we reject that request. The State provides
these facilities for all its citizens and it has not met its burden
under Brown to take affirmative steps to dismantle its prior de jure
system when it perpetuates a separate, but 'more equal' one. 222
The Court commented that maintaining all eight universities is "wasteful
and irrational.223 It noted the close proximity of Delta State University to
Mississippi Valley (only 35 miles apart) and Mississippi State to Missis-
sippi University for Women (20 miles apart).224 But the Court stopped
short of ordering Mississippi to close any of its universities.225
The ultimate impact of Fordice on public HBCUs is still not clear. How-
ever, the opinion leads to certain definite constitutional conclusions. The
Court clearly rejected the idea of strengthening public HBCUs as a means
of increasing the educational opportunities of blacks, meaning that states
that operated segregated higher education systems cannot be constitu-
tionally compelled to substantially strengthen and upgrade their black
public colleges. It is also clear that a Court will look suspiciously upon a
public school operated as an "exclusively black enclave" of private
choice.
D. Increasing Ethnic Diversity of Black Students Benefitting from
Affirmative Action Programs
There is a growing diversity in the population of black students,
which equates to a decline in the number of Ascendants on college cam-
puses, especially at selective colleges, universities and graduate programs
218. Id. at 731-32.
219. Id. at 729.
220. Id. at 743.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 505 U.S. at 741.
224. Id. at 741-42.
225. Id. at 742-43.
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that employ affirmative action admissions policies. This issue has been
receiving increased attention of late. Harvard professors Dr. Henry Louis
Gates Jr. and Lani Guinier pointed out during a black alumni gathering in
2003 that the children of African and Caribbean immigrants and children
of biracial couples together comprised two-thirds of Harvard's Black un-
dergraduate population.226 A year later an article by Ronald Roach in Di-
verse Issues in Higher Education pointed out that 41% of black freshmen at
28 selective schools identified themselves as immigrants, children of im-
migrants or mixed-race.227 Last year, Professor Angela Onwuachi Willig
published an article on this topic in the Vanderbilt Law Review.228
Immigration of blacks from different parts of the world has drastically
changed the makeup of the black student body on college and university
campuses. This is a relatively recent phenomenon. According to the 2000
census, there were almost 21 million foreign-born blacks in the United
States, constituting approximately 6.1% of the black population.229 Forty
one percent of black immigrants entered the U.S. between 1990 and
2000;230 32% entered between 1980 and 1989 and 27% before 1980.231
Using U.S. Census Bureau statistics, one study of K-12 schools found
that 3.5% of black students were born outside of the country and 13.6%
had at least one parent born in a foreign country.232 Both of these percent-
ages are approximately twice the rate for whites.233 The percentage of
blacks who are foreign-born rises significantly at the college and graduate
school levels. "More than 15% of all black undergraduate students en-
rolled at U.S. colleges and universities were born in a foreign land. This is
226. Ronald Roach, Drawing Upon the Diaspora, DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION,
Aug. 25, 2005, http://www.diverseeducation.com/artman/publish/article_4558.
shtml (last visited Dec. 10, 2007).
227. See id. The issue of racial classifications of students is complicated by the fact that
colleges, universities and graduate program applications will vary in how students
are allowed to identify themselves. The five traditional categories are African Amer-
ican/Black, Native American/Alaska Native, Asian American, Hispanic/Latino,
and White. However, there could be variations. Some allow applicants to check one
box, some allow them to check more than one box. In addition, there is a Common
Application that was used by more than 250 colleges and universities for the class of
2006 which includes ten options. For further discussion of this issue, see Nancy
Leong, Multiracial Identity and Affirmative Action, 12 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1,
6-8 (2006).
228. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1138, 1141
(2007).
229. This compares with 11.1% of the total U.S. population being foreign-born. JESSE D.
MCKINNON & CLAUDETTE E. BENNETT, WE THE PEOPLE: BLACKS IN THE UNITED STATES,
CENSUS SPECIAL REPORTS 7 fig.5 (2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/
censr-25.pdf. For figures related to the number of foreign-born blacks, see id. at 7
fig.5. In 2000, 84% of all foreign-born Blacks were from two regions--the Caribbean
(60%) and Africa (24%). Id. at 9. This compares with only 9% and 3%, respectively,
of the total foreign-born U.S. population. Id. at 9.
230. Id. at 8 fig.6.
231. JESSE D. MCKINNON & CLAUDETTE E. BENNETT, WE THE PEOPLE: BLACKS IN THE
UNITED STATES, CENSUS SPECIAL REPORTS 8 (2005), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2005pubs/censr-25.pdf.
232. A Solid Percentage of Black Students at U.S. Colleges and Universities are Foreign-born, J.
BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 2006, at 11.
233. Id.
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four times the rate for whites."234 In 2003, 22.2% of black undergraduates
had at least one parent born outside of the United States.235 "For enrolled
black graduate students, 16.5%, or one of every six, were born outside the
U.S."236 This compares with only 7.6% for white students.237 And 22.8% of
black graduate students had at least one foreign-born parent.238
Based on data from the 2000 census, black immigrants from Africa
had the highest college graduation rates of any ethnic group in the United
States. The college graduation rate for African immigrants was 43.8%
compared to 42.5% for Asian Americans, 28.9% for immigrants from Eu-
rope, Russia and Canada and 23.1% for the U.S. population as a whole.239
In fact, the African immigrants' education attainment levels of 14 years
actually exceed those of whites and Asians who are at 12.9 and 13.1 years,
respectively.240
The saturation of Black Immigrants when compared to native blacks
on college campuses also exists among selective colleges and universities.
A recent study using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Freshmen, which is a nationwide survey of students who entered 28 se-
lective colleges and universities in 1999,241 examined the issue. The study
noted that while only 13% of black 18- to 19-year-olds are first or second-
generation immigrants, they made up 27% of the freshmen at 28 selective
colleges and universities.42 The percentage of first and second-generation
black immigrants was actually higher at the ten most selective schools,
constituting 35.6%.243 It was also higher at four of the Ivy League schools
(Columbia, Princeton, Penn and Yale) where they made up 40.6% of the
black students enrolled.244 As Professor Guinier wrote in a Boston Globe
column, "[1]ike their wealthier White counterparts, many first- and sec-
ond-generation immigrants of color test well because they retain a na-
tional identity free of America's racial caste system and enjoy material







239. See Clarence Page, Black Immigrants Collect Most Degrees, But Affirmative Action is
Losing Direction, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 2007, at 7.
240. Id.
241. Douglas S. Massey, et al., Black Immigrants and Black Natives Attending Selective Col-
leges and Universities in the United States, 113 AM. J. ED. 243, 248 (2007). All of the 28
schools are selective in the sense that only a subset of those who apply are selected.
The least selective of the institutions was Miami University of Ohio with a 79%
acceptance rate and the most selective was Princeton with an 11% acceptance rate.
242. Id. at 245. In contrasting first and second generations, Asians and Latinos consti-
tuted 97% and 73% of the freshmen. But these percentages more closely approxi-
mate the percentage of 18- and 19-year-olds who are also first or second generation
immigrants, 91% and 66%, respectively.
243. Id. at 248 tbl.1.
244. Id.
245. Roach, supra note 226.
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In addition to the increasing representation of Black Immigrants, there
is evidence that Black Biracial students are also increasing in numbers.
Societal acceptance of interracial marriages, as well as the number of in-
terracial marriages, has increased significantly over the past 50 years in
the United States. As late as 1965, 48% of whites in a national poll indi-
cated approval of anti-miscegenation laws.246 In the South, the feeling was
even stronger with 72% of whites and 30% of blacks approved of such
laws.247 However, in a 1997 Gallup poll, 77% of blacks and 61% of whites
approved of interracial marriages.248
Except for whites, blacks are less likely to marry outside of their race
than any other group in the U.S.249 According to the calculations of Doug-
las Besharov and Timothy Sullivan, in 1960 about 1.7% of married blacks
had a white spouse.250 In 1990, the percentage had risen to about 8.3% for
246. ROBERT J. SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW 117, 121 (1972).
247. Id.
248. See Maria Root, The Color Of Love, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Apr. 8, 2002, at 54 (Contrast-
ingly, in 1990, a National Opinion Research Center poll asked how certain groups
would feel about a close relative marrying someone from outside their racial or
ethnic group and 57.5% of blacks were strongly opposed.); see also Stephen Thern-
strom & Abigail Themstrom, We Have Overcome, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 23
(stating that the proportion of whites who would like to see interracial marriage
outlawed has dropped from 62 to 16%); Walter C. Farrell, Jr. & James H. Johnson, Jr.,
Minority Political Participation in the New Millennium: the New Demographics and the
Voting Rights Act, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1215, 1222 (2001) (quoting Lawrence Bobo, et. al.,
Public Opinion Before and After the Spring of Discontent, in THE Los ANGELES RIOTS:
LESSONS FOR THE URBAN FUTURE 117, 119 (Mark Baldassare ed., 1995). When examin-
ing preference patterns regarding intermarriage, responses are somewhat similar.
Consistent with the previous findings, the strongest opposition is to intermarriage
involving Blacks. "Nearly one-third of White and Asian respondents and approxi-
mately 25% of Hispanics objected to an interracial marriage with an African-Ameri-
can."). See also Isabel Wilkerson, Black-White Marriages Rise, but Couples Still Face
Scorn, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1991, at Al (referencing polls suggesting that as much as
20% of whites continue to believe that interracial marriage should be illegal). An-
other survey of American attitudes showed that in 1997 67% of whites and 83% of
African-Americans approved of interracial marriages. See HOWARD SCHMAN, CHAR-
LOTTE STEEH, LAWRENCE BOBO & MARIA KRYSAN, RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA:
TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1997). Blacks are consistently rated as the least desir-
able spouses for children by Asians, Latinos and Whites. See Vincent Kang Fu, How
Many Melting Pots? Intermarriage, Pan ethnicity, and the Black/Non-Black Divide in the
United States, 38 J. COMP. FAM. STUDIES 215, 215 (2007).
249. The percentage of single race American Indian men in interracial marriages or co-
habitations in 2000 was reported at 57.4% and 40.3% respectively, for Asian Ameri-
can men 45.8% and 53.7% respectively, for Hispanic men 31.9% and 38.9%
respectively. For single race American Indian women, the percentage in interracial
marriages or cohabitations in 2000 was 58.5% and 41.5% respectively, Asian Ameri-
cans 59.6% and 66.3% respectively, and for Hispanics 30.7% and 36% respectively.
See Zhenchao Qian & Daniel T. Lichter, Social Boundaries and Marital Assimilation:
Interpreting Trends in Racial and Ethnic Intermarriage, 72 AMER. SOC. REV. 68, 79 (2007).
See also Vincent Kang Fu, How Many Melting Pots? Intermarriage, Pan ethnicity, and
the Black/Non-Black Divide in the United States, 38 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 215, 218 (2007)
("Blacks are consistently rated as the least desirable spouses for children of Asians,
Latinos, and Whites.").
250. Douglas J. Besharov & Timothy S. Sullivan, One Flesh, NEW DEMOCRAT, July-Aug.
1996, at 19.
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men and 3.3% for women.25' In the 2000 census, 9.7% of black men and
4.1% of black women who were married were in interracial marriages.252
A recent study of census data from 1990 and 2000 of married couples
between the ages of 20 and 34 indicates even higher rates of interracial
marriages among younger blacks.23 Native-born African-Americans ex-
perienced increases in interracial marriages as well as interracial cohabi-
tation2s4 between the 1990 and 2000 census. The calculation of interracial
marriage and interracial cohabitation is complicated by the fact that in the
1990 census individuals were only allowed to identify themselves in a
single race category, but in the 2000 census they were able to check all
racial categories that applied to them. Thus, in the 1990 census the native-
born black category included those who in the 2000 census self-identified
as both single race blacks and multiracial blacks. Interracial marriages in-
creased for both groups of blacks between 1990 and 2000. The percentage
of native-born black men who had married outside of their race increased
from the 1990 figure of 8.3% to 14.2% for single-race black men and to
14.9% for multiracial black/white men.255 For native-born black women,
the 1990 figure of 3.3% increased to 5.0% for single-race black women and
5.3% for multiracial black/white women.256
The 18 year-old college freshmen who enrolled in college this past fall
would have been born in 1989. Since then, the percentage of interracial
marriages and cohabitation by blacks has increased significantly. The per-
centage of Black Biracial college students is likely to continue to increase
for the near future, especially at selective colleges, universities and gradu-
ate programs. Further evidence of this probability comes from the fact
that according to the 2000 census the average age of mixed-race blacks is
251. See, e.g., Qian & Lichter, supra note 249, at 79.
252. See Sharon M. Lee & Barry Edmonstron, New Marriages, New Families: U.S. Racial and
Hispanic Intermarriages, POPULATION BULLETIN, June 2005, at 12. It should also be
noted that black immigrants and their children are slightly more likely to marry
outside of their race than third generation blacks. The interracial marriage rates of
first generation blacks is 14%, compared to 12% for second generation and 10% for
third generation and higher. See Barry Edmonstron, et. al., Recent Trends in Intermar-
riage and Immigration and their Effects on the Future of Racial Composition of the U.S.
Population, in THE NEW RACE QUESTION: HOW THE CENSUS COUNTS MULTIRACIAL IN-
DIVIDUALS 241 (Joel Perlmann & Mary C. Watrees eds. 2002).
253. See, e.g., Qian & Lichter, supra note 249, at 79.
254. While many individuals will get married, an alternative to marriage is cohabitation,
a short term marriage-like arrangement. It has contributed to a reduction in mar-
riage rates in early adulthood and an increase in the average age of first marriage.
The study also saw similar increases in the percentage of blacks involved in interra-
cial cohabitation arrangements. The authors stated that the percentage of African-
American males in interracial cohabitation arrangements increased from 14.9% to
21.9% between 1990 and 2000. For black women the increase was more modest,
from 5.3% to 6.2%. See id.
255. See Qian & Lichter, supra note 249, at 79.
256. Id. The percentage of native-born African-American men who identified as multira-
cial white who were in interracial marriages was 14.9% and the percentage of those
who identified as multiracial minority who were in interracial marriages was 15.4%.
Id.
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only 16.3 years compared to black alone at 30.4 years. 257 Where mixed-
race blacks constitute 8.4% of blacks under the age of 18, they are only
3.7% of those between the ages of 18 and 64 and only 2% of those aged 65
and older.58
Black Biracials also seem to be better educated than Ascendants. The
percentage of the black population over the age of 25 that has attained
some college or associate degree is 28.4%, compared to 33.3% for black
biracials.29 Whereas 14.3% of the black population over the age of 25 have
obtained a college degree, 20.6% of of mixed-race blacks have done so.260
Thus, they are 44% more likely to have a college degree. Black Bi-racial
children who self-identify as white also have higher test scores than those
who identify as black.261
III. IMPACTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND FEDERAL ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAW ON DALITS IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDIA
Only two of the four aspects discussed in the previous section in ap-
plying federal anti-discrimination law and constitutional law to higher
education of African-Americans apply to the discussion of Dalits. First, as
with blacks in the U.S., Dalits have constitutional protections against for-
mal discrimination in admissions by public colleges and universities. Fed-
eral legislation also prevents formal discrimination by private colleges
and universities in India against Dalits. Blacks have similar protections
against private colleges and universities under federal discrimination law
as the result of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Second, while affirm-
ative action is applied to both groups, the concept of "affirmative action"
functions very differently in India than it does in the U.S. Contrary to
affirmative action in the U.S., in India, affirmative action requires public
colleges and universities to reserve admissions seats for Dalits. Until re-
cently, private colleges and universities were also required to reserve ad-
missions seats for Dalits. However, a recent decision by the Indian
Supreme Court has placed this requirement in a state of flux.
The other two aspects of anti-discrimination law as applied to African-
Americans are generally not significant legal issues in the context of Dal-
its. Dalits never experienced an era comparable to the post-Civil War seg-
regation era in the U.S., and lack institutions where they were the
exclusive (or majority) race, comparable to HBCUs. Finally, there is no
real diversity within the Dalit group like the varied make-up of black
students in the U.S. Continued disapproval of inter-caste marriages, espe-
257. Jesse D. McKinnon & Claudette E. Bennett, We the People: Blacks in the United States,
CENSUS SPECIAL REPORTS, Aug. 2005, at 17 tbl.2, available at http://www.census.gov/
prod /2005pubs/censr-25.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 17 fig.6.
261. Melissa R. Herman, The Black-White-Other Test Score Gap: Academic Achievement
Among Mixed-Race Adolescents 26 (Nw. Univ. Inst. For Policy Research, Working Pa-
per No. IPR-WP-02-31, 2002). Herman also found that mixed race students of black
and Asian descent do better in school than monoracial blacks, but not as well as
Asians. Id. at 24.
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cially with Dalits, keeps the number of mixed-caste Dalit children rela-
tively small.262 In these limited cases, the general rule is that a child with a
Dalit father and non-Dalit mother is to be categorized as Dalit. A child
with a Dalit mother and a non-Dalit father is not Dalit. However, this is a
general rule and a lot of discretion is given to local governmental officials
who categorize citizens. If an official decides that the child has been ac-
cepted in the Scheduled Caste community, and has been brought up in
the surroundings of that community, then he may be treated by the gov-
ernment and the courts as Scheduled Caste.263
A. Development of Non-discrimination Policies to Protect Dalits in Colleges
and Universities
Article 15(1) and Article 16(1) of the Indian Constitution prevent any
kind of discrimination against Dalits.264 Further, Article 28(2) of the Indian
Constitution specifically prevents any discrimination based on caste
(amongst other factors) in public education admissions.265 These constitu-
tional provisions protecting Dalits do not apply to private colleges, but
there are several pieces of federal legislation that make any discrimina-
tion against Dalits by private individuals or entities a criminal offence.
For instance, The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 details a variety of discriminatory offences against
Dalits that are punishable under law.266 Thus, Dalits have federal legal
protection against discrimination in admissions by private colleges and
universities.
262. See Chu, supra note 78 (referring to a survey last year by the New Delhi-based
Center for the Study of Developing Societies, reasoning that 74% of Indians thought
inter-caste marriages were unacceptable).
263. Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum to State 1977, cited in LAURA DUDLEY JEN-
KINS, IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION IN INDIA: DEFINING THE DISADVANTAGED 78
(2003); see also Anjan Kumar v. Union of India (Civil Appeal No.6445 of 2000); but see
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=27481 (Indian Supreme
Court, 2000) (holding that a mixed-caste child born to parents outside the village,
and brought up in urban India, was not brought up in a Scheduled Caste commu-
nity, and therefore was not Dalit for the purposes of affirmative action).
264. INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 1 ("There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in
matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.").
265. "No citizen shall be denied admission into any education institution maintained by
the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
language or any of them." INDIA CONsT. art. 28, cl. 2.
266. Section 3 details the list of punishable atrocities. It is very broad in its sweep. Even a
suggestion of discrimination against Dalits (for instance, an innuendo, or derisive
comment) is punishable with a jail sentence. While this legislation does not specifi-
cally deal with public education, it is at times used in that context by students who
feel discrimination. There are several other laws which prevent discrimination
against Dalits. The Protection of Civil Rights Act (1955) prevents any denial of ac-
cess to professions, public spaces, educational institutions on the grounds of un-
touchability. The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act (1976) and The Child
Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act (1986) aim to address discrimination
against Dalits in their historic professions.
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B. Reservations for Dalits in Higher Education
Before delving into affirmative action for Dalits in higher education,
some data on higher education in India is useful in contextualizing the
debate. India currently has over 15,000 colleges and almost 10 million stu-
dents.267 The total number of undergraduate students in India is 7.85 mil-
lion per year,268 which is 6-7% of the population in that age group.269
"There has been a rapid expansion in higher education, with student en-
rollment growing at about 5[%] annually over the past two decades. This
growth is about two-and-half times the population growth rate, and re-
sults from both a population bulge in lower age cohorts [and] increased
demand for higher education."270 "Recent growth is much greater in pro-
fessional colleges (especially engineering, management and medicine), as
well as in private vocational courses catering especially to the [informa-
tion technology] sector."271 The southern and western states of India have
higher enrollment rates than the eastern states.272
There are three types of higher education institutions in India: public
institutions, private (or unaided) institutions and minority institutions.
Different legal provisions concerning reservations for Dalits apply to each
of them. This section will discuss the different legal rules that apply to
each of these types of higher education institutions.
1. Public Institutions
Public institutions of higher education are those that are partly or fully
funded by the government. While there are universities that are partially
funded by the government, there are only 221 government-run universi-
ties in India.273 Eighteen of these universities are operated by the central
education institutions2 74 and the remaining 203 are state government edu-
cation institutions.275 Public institutions reserve 15% of their admissions
seats for Dalits.276 However, a few of these public institutions are desig-
nated 'Institutes of National Importance,' which must reserve 15% of their
seats for Dalits, but do not need to accommodate Dalits by allowing lower
scores on entrance examinations. 277 As a result, many of the seats in these
267. Devesh Kapur & Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Indian Higher Education Reform: From Half-
Baked Socialism to Half-Baked Capitalism 4 (Harvard Ctr. for Int'l Dev., Working Paper
No. 108, 2004), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/108.pdf.
268. Education in India: Past, Present, and the Future: Ideas, Policies, and Initiatives,
"Lok Sabha: Unstarred Question no. 221," Dec. 12, 2004, http://prayatna.typepad.
com/education/datastatistics/index.html (last viewed Oct. 19, 2006).
269. Id.
270. Kapur & Mehta, supra note 267, at 4.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See Government of India Department of Higher Education website, http://educa-
tion.nic.in/higedu.asp#C%20E%20N%20T%20R%20A%20L%20%20%20U%20N%20
I%20V%20E%20R%20S%201%20T%20I%20E%20S (last visited July 27, 2007).
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. Sector Overview of the Department of Higher Education, Government of India,
http://www.education.nic.in/sector.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
277. See, e.g., Dalits and BCs Suffer Under Brahminical Dictatorship in lIT- Madras, OOMAI,
May 18, 2006, available at http: / /oomai.wordpress.com/2006/05/18/dalits-bcs-suf-
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institutions which are reserved for Dalits are not filled. There also is no
obligation to appoint Dalits to faculty positions.278
The reservation percentage is based upon the percentage of Dalits in
India according to the 1932 caste census. Recent census figures put the
current percentage of Dalits at 16.5%.279 The rationale behind linking the
percentage of reservations in public higher education institutions to the
national percentage of Dalits in the Indian population derives from the
pre-independence era when reservations were initially conceptualized.
Originally, reservations were used to assure adequate representation in
the legislature. The Indian government considered reservations in higher
education a logical extension of the concept of reservations in the political
process.
It is one thing to reserve seats at public colleges and universities for
Dalits, but it is another to assure that they occupy those reserved seats.
Whether Dalits actually occupy these reserved seats is difficult to deter-
mine. The government has compiled no countrywide statistics for higher
education. Evidence collected from specific universities suggests that the
number of reserved seats filled may only be about 50%.280 Since this data
is only from a few universities, it would be hazardous to extrapolate that
percentage to all Indian universities with reservations. A further issue is
the number of Dalits who graduate. In contrast to the U.S., where college
graduation statistics are readily available, reliable data (from the govern-
ment or from private sources) on graduation rates in India is not
available.
2. Private Institutions
Data on the total number of private institutions in India is unavailable.
There is some data demonstrating substantial growth of private institu-
tions in certain fields. For example, it is reported that the percentage of
seats in engineering in private universities rose from 15% in 1960 to 86.4%
currently.81 In medical colleges, the proportion of private seats has risen
from 6.8% of the total in 1960 to 40.9% in 2003.282 There are estimates that
90% of the business schools are private education institutions.283
fer-under-brahminical-dictatorship-in-iit-madras/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2008); Dalit
Media Network, Dalits at the Indian Institutes of Technology, PUCL Bulletin, available
at http://www.pucl.org/reports/National/2001/dalits.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2008).
278. See, e.g., id.
279. 1991 Census of India, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes Population, available
at http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census-Data-2001/India atGlance/scst.aspx
(last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
280. See Decision on Quota Is Final: Arjun, IBN LIVE (May 21, 2006), available at http://
www.ibnlive.com/news/decision-on-quota-is-final-arjun/11063-4-single.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2008). The Parliamentary Committee on the welfare for the Sched-
uled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, looking at the Delhi University between 1995 and
2000, notes that half the seats for undergraduates at the Scheduled Castes level were
filled. This question was posed to the Minister for Human Resource Development,
Arjun Singh, by a television interviewer. Id.
281. Kapur & Mehta, supra note 267, at 6.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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In India, there are four types of private institutions for higher educa-
tion. These institutions may receive partial or no funding from the gov-
ernment. The first type is universities set up by private individuals or
organizations, through the central government's University Grants Com-
mission (UGC).24 The second are those recognized by a 'state' (as op-
posed to federal) legislature.285 For instance, the Karnataka state
legislature can pass legislation recognizing a private education institution
as a university.286 This is a recently created category and UGC approval is
not required. The third category consists of private colleges operating
under a government university. Only a university can grant a "recog-
nized degree" in India. In order for these types of universities-which are
legally termed "unaided private education institutions" -to grant de-
grees, they must affiliate with a state-operated government university.
The private college students who attend these institutions must follow the
university schedule and take the university examination. All colleges
under the same university have to adhere to the standardized course pat-
tern followed by the university. Unlike in the U.S., the same university
can have a variety of colleges (set up for different reasons, by different
people or communities) under it. These three types of institutions can all
confer degrees.
In the 2002 decision of the Indian Supreme Court in TMA Pai Founda-
tion v. State of Karnataka, the Court elaborated on rights of citizens under
Article 19 (1)(g) of the Indian Constitution, which confers a fundamental
right upon all citizens to "practice any profession, or to carry on any oc-
cupation, trade or business.287 This case was decided by 11 judges, the
second largest bench strength ever in Indian constitutional history.288 This
case addressed a large number of issues regarding higher education in
India. Its holding on minority education institutions is dealt with in the
next sub-section of this Article. However, with regard to private institu-
tions, the Court stressed the "essentially charitable nature" of providing
education, which rules out education as a business.289 A six-to-five major-
284. See AMRIK SINGH, FiFTY YEARS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDIA: THE ROLE OF THE
UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION (2004).
285. Yashpal v. State of Chattisgarh, (2005) 2 S.C.C. 61 (India Supreme Court, 2005), held
that executive action could not create private universities; they may only be created
by states through legislation.
286. See, e.g., The creation of National Law School of India University (NLSIU) by state
legislation at the NLSIU Homepage, http://www.nls.ac.in/about-history.html (last
visited Mar. 22, 2008).
287. (2002) 8 S.C.C. 481 (India Supreme Court, 2002).
288. In India, the phrase 'bench strength' refers to the number of judges that are hearing
or have heard a particular case. This is decided by the Chief Justice of a particular
court. This 'bench strength' is important because it indicates the relative ability of
the judges in that case to overturn previously decided law. Decisions made by a
particular 'bench strength' can be overturned only by a higher bench strength, and
is binding on a lower bench strength. Therefore, when the Chief Justice of India
allocates a certain number of judges to hear a case (the 'bench strength'), it indicates
what he thinks the Court should be doing in that case. If the number of judges that
he allocates to a case is higher than the 'bench strength' of the previous case which
involved similar facts, it means that he expects the previous decision to be definitely
reconsidered, and perhaps even overturned.
289. (2002) 8 S.C.C. 481 (India Supreme Court, 2002).
46 E HARVARD BLACKLETrER LAW JOURNAL N VOL. 24, 2008
ity of the Court concluded, however, that the provision of education is a
legitimate "occupation."290
In 2005 in the case of P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra,291 the Su-
preme Court relied upon the implications of the TMA Pai Foundation
opinion to hold that the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right of
private higher education found in Article 19 (1)(g) meant that the govern-
ment could not exercise control over private institutions without clear
legislative authority.292 With this decision, the government lost control of
half the seats in private colleges and the corresponding reservations for
Dalits included in these seats.
Within months Parliament passed the 93rd Constitutional Amend-
ment that introduced Article 15(5).293 This amendment gives state and fed-
eral governments the power to establish reservations for Schedule Castes
and Scheduled Tribes in non-minority private education institutions, in-
cluding colleges and universities. 294 However, the amendment is not self-
executing. State and federal governments must enact legislation in order
to reestablish reservations in private institutions. While the central gov-
ernment has introduced a bill for reservations in private institutions of
higher education titled "Private Professional Education Institutions Bill,
2005" in Parliament, it has not been voted upon. Thus, as of today, there
are no reservations in private higher education institutions in India.
Another development related to Article 15(5) threatens the future pos-
sibility of any governmental legislative body to enact a provision requir-
ing reservations in private institutions. Using its powers under Article
15(5), in December 2006, Parliament passed a law to ensure 27% reserva-
tions for OBCs in central government education institutions.295 These cen-
tral government higher education institutions already had reservations
for Dalits and Scheduled Tribes of up to 22.5% of all seats.296 While reser-
vations for OBCs exist in other areas, 297 they had not included central gov-
290. Id.
291. (2004) 8 S.C.C. 139 (India Supreme Court, 2004).
292. Id. INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 1 reads "All citizens shall have the right ... to practise
[sic] any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business."
293. The 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act s.2 reads, "Amendment of article 15.-In
article 15 of the Constitution, after clause (4), the following clause shall be inserted,
namely:- (5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall
prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement
of any socially and educationly [sic] backward classes of citizens or for the Sched-
uled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to
their admission to education institutions including private education institutions,
whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority education institu-
tions referred to in clause (1) of article 30."
294. It also provides for the first time for reservations for OBCs. Id.
295. Central Education Institutions Act (2007). The Supreme Court stayed the enforce-
ment of this legislation on the grounds that inadequate data exists on the categori-
zation of OBCs. The stay was granted by an interim order in Ashoka Kumar Thakur
v. Union of India, 2007 (5) S.C.A.L.E. 179 (India Supreme Court, 2007). The case was
referred to a higher bench.
296. Sector Overview of the Department of Higher Education, Government of India,
http://www.education.nic.in/sector.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
297. Reservations for OBCs have existed in state government employment and state edu-
cation since the 1960s, but this has been confined to only some states. See Christophe
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ernment higher education institutions. The extension of additional
reservations to OBCs created a huge controversy in India. The Supreme
Court stayed the enforcement of this legislation because inadequate data
existed on the categorization of OBCs.298 The Supreme Court specifically
exempted any provision benefiting Dalits (and tribals) from the ambit of
its stay.299 In the stay, the Court referred the case to a higher bench.00 This
by itself does not have any impact on Dalits. However, the higher bench
that is currently hearing the matter included within its considerations the
issue of whether there can be reservations in private colleges at all.301 This
is of great concern to Dalits, as well as OBCs and Scheduled Tribes. If the
Indian Supreme Court strikes down article 15(5), not only will the gov-
Jaffrelot, The politics of OBCs, http://www.india-seminar.com/2005/549/549%20
christophe%20jaffrelot.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). Also, the subcastes termed as
OBC significantly vary from state to state. In 1990, the V.P. Singh government is-
sued an executive notification accepting the Mandal Report (see discussion of the
Mandal Report in supra note 117, which recommended the establishment of reserva-
tions of 27% of seats for OBCs in central government jobs). This was on top of the
22.5% reservations that existed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The de-
cision by the Singh government was challenged. The Indian Supreme Court ad-
dressed a number of issues related to the extension of reservations to OBCs in
government employment, including upholding the 27% reservations for OBCs. In-
dra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 447 (India Supreme Court, 1993).
Among other things, the petitioners challenging the implementation of the Mandal
Report in the Indra Sawhney decision argued that some members of the designated
OBCs were highly advanced socially, economically, and educationally. Indira
Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477. They argued that these highly ad-
vanced members, the "creamy layer," constituted the forward section of that partic-
ular backward class. Id. If they were allowed to benefit from reservations, they
would garner almost all the benefits of reservation meant for that class, without
allowing the benefits to reach the truly backward members of that class. Accepting
this argument by the petitioners, the Court concluded that the economically well-off
layer in any traditionally deprived community or group should be excluded from
reservations. Id. Thus, the "Creamy Layer Exclusion" means that those OBCs who
are economically well-off are barred from benefiting from reservations. The Court in
the Indra Sawhney case directed the Government of India to develop criteria to use
to determine the creamy layer. Id. Persons falling within the net of the exclusionary
rule would cease to be OBCs (covered by the expression 'backward class of citi-
zens') for the purpose of Article 16(4).
The Indian Supreme Court specifically stated in the Indra Sawhney opinion that
the Creamy Layer Exclusion did not apply to Dalits. Id. The connecting link for
Dalits is not social backwardness, but untouchability. There may be "socially ad-
vanced" persons among Dalits, but they cannot be excluded from the protected
group because they continue to suffer from the vice of untouchability. OBCs, how-
ever, have to be recognized as a characteristic distinct from that of mere social back-
wardness. There is a remote possibility that the Creamy Layer Exclusion, which
applies to OBCs, might be applied to Dalits in the future. See M. Nagaraj and Others
v. Union of India and Others (8) S.C.C. 212 (India Supreme Court, 2006). But for
now it appears unlikely. Venkatesan, Ambiguous Verdict, FRONTLINE, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2322/stories/20061117007203200.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008).
298. The stay was granted by an interim order in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of
India, 2007 (5) S.C.A.L.E. 179 (India Supreme Court, 2007).
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ernment lose the ability to enact reservations in central education institu-
tions for OBCs, they will also lose their ability to enact any kind of
reservations in private colleges. This will have an enormous impact on
Dalits because it will eliminate the ability to compel reservations by pri-
vate colleges. Its importance cannot be exaggerated. As of March 12, 2008,
the case has been argued before the Supreme Court, but not yet decided.
The fourth type of private higher education institution is composed of
institutions void of any kind of government control. These institutions are
not given the power to issue degrees, but instead are limited to issuing
diplomas. Diplomas (unlike degrees) have no legal standing. They are
merely certificates given by private entities and are not recognized by the
government. The value of a diploma is purely based on the reputation of
the diploma-granting institution. There are a few such institutions whose
diplomas are considered valuable, especially in computer science educa-
tion. Companies in India will accept diplomas from graduates of these
institutions when looking for qualified applicants.02 Reservations do not
apply to these education institutions.
3. Minority Education Institutions
Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution allows religious and linguistic
minorities to establish education institutions of their choice.303 These insti-
tutions enjoy a vast degree of autonomy from the government. They can
conduct their own courses, determine which students they admit, and
control their administration, even if the government funds the institu-
tion.304 The purpose of Article 30(1) was to placate religious and linguistic
groups who sought reservations for themselves. The framers of the Con-
stitution were reluctant to reserve seats for different religious groups, be-
lieving that it would create a divided India.05 In order to placate these
groups, they were given the right to form education institutions free from
government interference in which they could educate their own, and
propagate their unique identity.
In 2002, the Indian Supreme Court in the TMA Pai Foundation case
held that privately-funded minority institutions did not have any obliga-
tions toward the government and consequently there would be no reser-
vations in any minority institution.306 This was a result of an
302. For example, the Indian Institute of Planning and Management (IIPM) offers "in-
dustry recognized" management diplomas, and helps make up for the huge
shortfall in management graduates in India. See the IIPM Homepage, http://www.
iipm.edu/iipm-old/admission-application-details.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2008).
303. "All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to es-
tablish and administer education institutions of their choice." INDIA CONST. art. 30,
cl. 1.
304. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 S.C.C. 481 (India Supreme
Court, 2002).
305. Zoya Hassan, Reservations for Muslims, REDRESSING DISADVANTAGES: A SYMPOSIUM
ON RESERVATIONS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 549 (2005), available at http://www.in-
dia-seminar.com/2005/549/549%20zoya%20hassan.htm.
306. (2002) 8 S.C.C. 481 (India Supreme Court, 2002).
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interpretation of Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution, which provides
for special rights for "minority education institutions."307
IV. LESSONs LEARNED
There are five principal lessons we want to highlight from this com-
parison of the application of constitutional and federal discrimination
laws to higher education opportunities of African-Americans in the U.S.
with Dalits in India. The first two lessons are the most straightforward.
First, decisions by the Supreme Courts of both countries expanding the
constitutional protection of individual rights through the equality clauses
of the respective Constitutions reduced the opportunities of both groups.
The second lesson relates to the benefits of having a special provision in
the Constitution to protect the State when it is making special provisions
for the advancement of oppressed groups. Dalits have such a provision in
the Indian Constitution, but blacks do not in the U.S. Constitution.
The last three lessons, however, are not generally recognized. These
lessons are obscured because of the normal negative comparative frame-
work that typically compares the situation of African-Americans to that
of non-Hispanic whites. The third lesson highlights the far more positive
justifications for affirmative action for African-Americans and other un-
derrepresented minorities with a history of discrimination that exist in
the U.S., in contrast to those for affirmative action through reservations in
India. Fourth, African-Americans were able to make progress in obtaining
access to higher education under the "separate but equal" regime
through the creation and maintenance of HBCUs. In contrast, Dalits did
not have the benefit of separate higher education institutions. Fifth, it is
too early to tell how the changing racial and ethnic ancestry of the black
population and the decreasing proportion of Ascendants will affect af-
firmative action. Regardless of one's opinion on affirmative action, the
changing ancestry of blacks who "benefit" from affirmative action stands
as testament to the significant progress in the reduction of racism that
blacks in American society have achieved compared to Dalits.
A. First Lesson: Both Groups are Helped and Harmed By Supreme Court's
Protection of Individual Rights
Individual rights can both help and harm groups subject to historical
oppression based upon an involuntary trait. The purpose of individual
rights is to foster the ability of individuals to choose what to do in and
with their own lives. The non-discrimination aspect of individual rights
rejects the idea of restricting the rights because certain individuals pos-
sess an involuntary trait. When the government in particular restricts in-
dividual rights, it denies the right of self-determination. When it is
necessary to combat conscious discrimination based on an involuntary
trait, protection of individual rights will be effective at assisting an op-
pressed group. Thus, both blacks and Dalits benefit from discrimination
307. "All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to es-
tablish and administer education institutions of their choice." INDIA CONST. art. 30,
cl. 1.
50 E HARVARD BLACKLETTER LAW JOURNAL U VOL. 24, 2008
laws that prohibit education institutions from denying them admission
based solely on their race or untouchability. Nevertheless, the protection
of individual rights places significant obstacles on the path to equality for
oppressed groups. Protecting individual rights ignores the group effects
of historical racial oppression or untouchability and hinders enactment of
policies and practices seeking to ameliorate those group-based effects.
Taking account of the involuntary traits of groups to overcome the effects
of historical oppression appears to grant them favored treatment at the
expense of the individuals who are from racial or caste groups that were
not subjected to historic discrimination.
The U.S. Supreme Court, concluding that the Equal Protection Clause
should only protect the rights of individuals, reduced the higher educa-
tion opportunities of blacks in a number of its significant decisions. If the
Court held true to its articulation of the original purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause in the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases, the higher education
opportunities for African-Americans would, arguably, be greater today.
In Bakke, the Court prohibited the reservation of a certain number of ad-
missions seats for blacks or other minority groups because such reserva-
tions would violate the individual rights of those not from a "favored"
group.308 In Gratz, the Supreme Court rejected a system of allocating
points in the admissions process to individuals from under-represented
minority backgrounds, including blacks.309 The Court required that col-
leges, universities or graduate programs that use affirmative action in ad-
missions employ a holistic and individualized evaluation process.310
Using such an admissions process substantially increases the administra-
tive burden of institutions wishing to use affirmative action over a point
system. Thus, instituting affirmative action became more expensive for
institutions. Such a point system could be used for admissions decisions
absent a concern about the inclusion of underrepresented minorities. The
cost alone may reduce the attractiveness of affirmative action for some
selective higher education programs.
While rejecting admissions quotas and point systems, the Supreme
Court did allow selective colleges, universities and graduate programs to
use race as one of many factors in an individualized admissions pro-
cess. 31' The basis for the use of race by these institutions, however, is the
protection of the First Amendment right of academic freedom that col-
leges and universities possess, rather than a special concern about the
rights of African-Americans who have suffered from historic racial op-
pression for centuries. As a result, whether to provide positive considera-
tions to blacks in the admissions process is a matter of state law and the
academic judgment of higher education officials; it is not a requirement to
ameliorate past or present effects of racial discrimination.
The Supreme Court also reduced the potential higher education op-
portunities for blacks when it rejected strengthening state-operated
308. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
309. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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HBCUs as a partial remedy for the operation of an unconstitutional dual
higher education system by the State of Mississippi.32 In rejecting this
partial remedy, the Court noted that the remedial obligation of a formerly
dual state university system was to ensure that the choices of prospective
students regarding which college or university to attend were not im-
peded by the state's prior operation of a dual system.3 3 Accordingly, the
Court articulated that strengthening black public colleges and universities
is not an adequate remedy for the state's operation of a dual system of
higher education because of a respect for individual choice.14 However,
the result is to deny blacks the choice of attending academically strength-
ened public HBCUs, despite the fact that they were denied access to the
better academic institutions reserved exclusively for whites during both
the historic period of chattel slavery and de jure segregation.
Dalits have also seen their higher education opportunities reduced by
the Indian Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations that have in-
creased protection for individual rights. The 2005 Indian Supreme Court
decision in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra35 has the potential to sig-
nificantly reduce opportunities for Dalits. That decision placed govern-
ment reservations for Dalits at private education institutions at the mercy
of the political process when it concluded that these institutions have a
constitutional right to be free from government control in the absence of
clear legislative authority.16 Even though Parliament quickly reacted to
the decision by amending the Indian Constitution to give state and fed-
eral governments the power to establish reservations for Schedule Castes
in non-minority private education institutions,317 no legislative body has
established those to this point. While it is too early to tell what the ulti-
mate resolution will be, it is clear that for now, Dalits could lose signifi-
cant higher education opportunities with this decision to protect
individual rights of private institutions.
B. Second Lesson: Constitutional Provision Protecting the Government's
Ability to Make Special Provisions for Scheduled Castes Places Dalits in
a Better Constitutional Position than African-Americans
The Indian Constitution has a clause allowing the State to make any
special provision for the advancement of Schedule Castes, Schedule
Tribes and other socially and educationally backwards classes of citizens
312. U.S. v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
313. Id at 729.
314. Id.
315. (2004) 8 S.C.C. 139 (India Supreme Court, 2004).
316. Id.
317. The 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act s.2 reads, "Amendment of article 15.-In
article 15 of the Constitution, after clause (4), the following clause shall be inserted,
namely:- "(5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19
shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advance-
ment of any socially and educationly backward classes of citizens or for the Sched-
uled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to
their admission to education institutions including private education institutions,
whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority education institu-
tions referred to in clause (1) of article 30."
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(OBCs).318 The Indian Supreme Court upheld this clause in Indira Sawhney
v. Union of India when it also upheld the validity of reservations for gov-
ernment jobs.319 In reaching this conclusion, the Indian Supreme Court
reasoned that if reservations exceeded 50% of the jobs, then the exception
would become greater than the rule.320 The Court has previously con-
cluded that the fundamental right of equality contained within Article 15
(1) required the 50% ceiling on reservations. 321 Since the limitation on res-
ervations applied to OBCs and not Dalits, the opinion protects reserva-
tions for Dalits from a right to equality challenge.
The U.S. Constitution does not have specific language allowing the
government to make special provisions for the advancement of blacks or
any other underrepresented group with a history of discrimination with-
out violating the Equal Protection Clause, and these plans are vulnerable
as shown in Bakke322 and Gratz.323 Since discrimination banned under the
Equal Protection Clause also violates Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,324 these decisions also apply to private colleges and universities re-
ceiving federal money. The history surrounding the Reconstruction
Amendments ratification and the Supreme Court's statement regarding
the purpose of those amendments in general-and the Equal Protection
Clause in particular-in its 1873 opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases325 sug-
gests that these amendments were intended to provide the very kind of
protection for blacks that Dalits receive from specific language in the In-
dian Constitution. However, the language of the Equal Protection Clause
allowed the Supreme Court to later interpret it as a provision to protect
the rights of individuals, rather than the rights of blacks as a group. When
Justice Powell authored his deciding opinion in Bakke, for example, he
stated:
Although many of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
conceived of its primary function as bridging the vast distance be-
tween members of the Negro race and the white 'majority,'... the
Amendment itself was framed in universal terms, without refer-
ence to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude.326
Justice O'Connor, in her opinion in City of Richmond v. Croson, reading the
text of the Equal Protection Clause, stated that "the Framers of the Four-
318. INDIA CONST. art. 330-42.
319. Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477 (India Supreme Court, 1993).
320. Id.
321. See Balaji v. State of Mysore, 50 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649, 663 (1963) (holding that the
total percentage of reservations permissible under Article 15(4) of the Indian Consti-
tution should generally be less than 50%). See also Rajkumar v. Gulbarga University,
77 A.I.R. (Kant.) 320, 332 (1990) (following the 50% limit for reservations).
322. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
323. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
324. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance.").
325. 83 U.S. 36.
326. 438 U.S. at 293.
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teenth Amendment... desired to place clear limits on the States' use of
race as a criterion for legislative action."327
C. Third Lesson: Basis for Affirmative Action for African-Americans Suggest
that They Are Held in Higher Regard in the United States than Dalits
Are in India
When the Supreme Court affirmed the ability of selective colleges and
universities to consider race in their admissions processes, it based this
affirmation on the benefits derived from a diverse student body.328
O'Connor noted that the benefits of enrolling a critical mass of under-
represented minority students with a history of discrimination are
substantial.329
Since colleges and universities in the U.S. are not required to enroll a
critical mass of underrepresented minority students, including blacks,
those that adopt affirmative action admissions policies must determine
that the inclusion of blacks is educationally beneficial to all students. As
Lee C. Bollinger, President of Columbia University and the former presi-
dent of the University of Michigan, recently summarized:
Universities understand that to remain competitive, their most
important obligation is to determine-and then deliver-what fu-
ture graduates will need to know about their world and how to
gain that knowledge. While the last century witnessed a new de-
mand for specialized research, prizing the expert's vertical mas-
tery of a single field, the emerging global reality calls for new
specialists who can synthesize a diversity of fields and draw quick
connections among them. In reordering our sense of the earth's
interdependence, that global reality also cries out for a new age of
exploration, with students displaying the daring, curiosity, and
mettle to discover and learn entirely new areas of knowledge.
The experience of arriving on a campus to live and study with
classmates from a diverse range of backgrounds is essential to stu-
dents' training for this new world, nurturing in them an instinct to
reach out instead of clinging to the comforts of what seems natu-
ral or familiar. We know that connecting with people very-or
even slightly-different from ourselves stimulates the imagina-
tion; and when we learn to see the world through a multiplicity of
eyes, we only make ourselves more nimble in mastering-and in-
tegrating-the diverse fields of knowledge awaiting us.
Affirmative-action programs help achieve that larger goal.
And the universities that create and carry them out do so not only
because overcoming longstanding obstacles to people of color and
women in higher education is the right thing to do, but also because
327. 488 U.S. at 491 (1989).
328. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) ("Our conclusion that the Law
School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view
that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper
institutional mission.").
329. Id.
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policies that encourage a comprehensive diversity help universities
achieve their mission. Specifically, they are indispensable in training fu-
ture leaders how to lead all of society, and by attracting a diverse cadre of
students and faculty, they increase our universities' chances of filling
gaps in our knowledge with research and teaching on a wider-and often
uncovered-array of subjects (emphasis added).330
To admit that all students' education is benefited by the inclusion of
black students is to admit that their presence is not just tolerated, but
actually sought. The Supreme Court's opinion in Grutter also pointed out
that the benefits of affirmative action go far beyond education.331 The
Court noted that diversity improves the development of skills necessary
for the "increasingly global marketplace;"332 improves the ability of the
military to "fulfill its principle mission to provide national security;"333
and by making the paths to leadership open to all, increases the trust of
the American people in their leaders.34
The justifications for affirmative action for Dalits are limited to the
effects of historic oppression. There is no recognition that Dalits in the
classroom, in businesses or in the military will strengthen Indian society.
Justifications for affirmative action are far more positive for black stu-
dents than Dalits because the presence of black students is desired, not
justified solely on notions of compensating for historic oppression. Stu-
dents would rather be welcomed into a place of learning with the mantra,
"come and we can learn from each other," rather than a begrudging feel-
ing of indebtedness for historical victimization.
D. Fourth Lesson: Segregation Provided Unique Opportunities for African
Americans to Pursue Higher Education
While segregation was an oppressive system, in comparison to the his-
tory of Dalits, African-Americans were able to make significant advance-
ments that have aided their collective struggle to eradicate the effects of
oppression. Segregation involved separating blacks from whites, particu-
larly in social relations, and severely limiting their employment opportu-
nities. However, this separation also provided a separate sphere where
blacks could develop their own talents and skills, even if they were lim-
ited to serving other blacks. In effect, blacks existed as a nation within a
nation.35 Segregation required blacks to become trained as their own pro-
330. Lee C. Bollinger, Chron. Rev., Why Diversity Matters, 53 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 39,
June 1, 2007, at B20.
331. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 331.
334. Id. at 332-33.
335. Dr. C. Munford described the black nation: "It is different from other emergent
nations only in that it consists of forcibly transplanted colonial subjects who have
acquired cohesive identity in the course of centuries of struggle against enslave-
ment, cultural alienation, and the spiritual cannibalism of white racism. This com-
mon history which the Black people of America share is manifested in a concrete
national culture with a peculiar 'spiritual complexion,' or psychological tempera-
ment. Though the Black nation expresses its thoughts, emotions, and aspirations in
the same tongue as American whites, the different conditions of existence ... have,
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fessionals such as lawyers, accountants, businesspersons, teachers, and
doctors. They also had to publish their own newspapers and develop
their own community organizations.
Dalits did not experience the advantages related to the self-autonomy
that indirectly resulted from segregation. Hindu society never consid-
ered, nor treated, Dalits as a nation within a nation. Dalits were instead
forced into the lowest status of society and compelled to perform occupa-
tions considered ritually impure. Even the idea of Dalits training them-
selves in diverse occupations to serve other Dalits was out of the picture.
Thus, while HBCUs developed principally to train black professionals
that were ultimately limited to working within the black community, they
experienced some progress as compared to Dalits. While African-Ameri-
cans trained in HBCUs became an educated elite class prepared to take
advantage of opportunities that became available when American society
opened to integration starting in the 1950s, Dalits remain disadvantaged
because they are widely untrained for occupations other than those into
which they have historically been forced.
The era of segregation in America was separate yet far from equal.
Nevertheless, it was far better than the total denial of opportunities that
Dalits experienced during the same period. Even though the Supreme
Court's opinion in Fordice336 and other lower federal court opinions337 re-
duced education opportunities for blacks in public HBCUs, these public
and private HBCUs still provide viable alternatives of higher education
for black students, making them better off than they would be if these
institutions never existed.338
E. Fifth Lesson: Decreasing Representation of Ascendants in Affirmative
Action Programs
It is too early to tell what the impact on affirmative action will be from
the increasing recognition that Black Biracials and Black Immigrants are
from generation to generation, welded the bonds of a national experience as differ-
ent from that of white existence as day is from night. And what differentiates na-
tions from one another are dissimilar conditions of life." Turner, Black Nationalism:
The Inevitable Response, BLACK WORLD, Jan. 1971, at 7-8 (quoting Address by C. Mun-
ford, Black National Revolution in America, Utah State University (May 1970)).
336. U.S. v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) (holding that Mississippi, with its continued
operation of three historically black universities and five historically white universi-
ties, had failed to prove that it had ended de jure segregation of its higher education
system).
337. See, e.g., Ala. State Teachers Ass'n v. Ala. Pub. Sch. and Coll. Auth., 289 F. Supp. 784
(M.D. Ala. 1968) (allowing construction of a new university built in "good faith
[with] the basic requirement of the affimative duty to dismantle the dual school
system on the college level"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 400 (1969); Norris v. State Council
of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1971) ("a state is obliged to convert its
white colleges and black colleges to just colleges"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 907 (1971);
Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.C. 1973) (stating that segregated systems
of higher education violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
338. See, e.g., Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness in Higher Education: Does "Sound
Education Policy" Support the Continued Existence of Historically Black Colleges? 43 EM-
ORY L.J. 1, 10-134 (1994) (discussing the "indispensable role that historically Black
colleges have played").
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displacing Ascendants in affirmative action programs. Recognition of the
potential problem created by the under-representation of Ascendants,
however, requires acknowledging significant signs of progress in the re-
duction of racism that blacks face in American society compared to Dalits
in India.
Interracial marriages and cohabitation, to varying degrees, will unite
families, friends and other social networks of interracial couples. Increas-
ing interracial marriages or interracial cohabitation is a reflection of
weakening racial barriers and increasing social interaction between racial
groups. Recall that America has only just passed the 53rd anniversary of
the racially motivated and largely publicized murder of Emmett Till, a
black fourteen-year-old boy who was killed for allegedly whistling at a
white woman.339 Yet today, racial lines are fading, and the increasing ac-
ceptance of interracial relationships and mixed-race children is causing us
to rethink the meaning of affirmative action.
In contrast, Indian society continues to view marriages between lower
caste and upper caste Hindus, especially Dalits, with great disdain. For an
overwhelming majority of Indians, their marriage prospects and partners
are determined by their place of birth in the Hindu hierarchy. While inter-
caste marriages have been legal in India since 1955,340 a survey last year
by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi re-
ported that 74% of Indians believed inter-caste marriages were unaccept-
able.41 Members of inter-caste marriages often face hostility and
ostracism. Many times these individuals are required to flee their homes
to avoid "honor killings" by relatives of the higher-caste spouse. For ex-
ample, a few years ago near New Delhi, relatives publicly executed an
upper-caste girl and Dalit boy because the two had started a relation-
ship.342 Three men in a town near Mumbai (Bombay) in 2006 were sen-
tenced to death for the murder of four people motivated by an inter-caste
marriage.34 3 Another Brahmin man and two of his friends hacked his sis-
ter's husband, two of his relatives and one of his neighbors to death in
May 2004 because the sister married into a lower-caste family.344 One
news report on the honor killing of a couple stated that "the murders of
young women and men, who have married by choice or across caste bar-
riers, often go unnoticed. There are no names, not even statistics. Many
are not investigated because the community closes ranks, apparently
making it impossible to find out what really happened."345 These honor
killings are not confined to India. Recently, a Hindu man was accused of
339. See Natasha Korecki, It's time to get at the facts, prosecutor says; Mississippi DA says
she'll file charges in Till case if justified, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 12, 2005, at 10.
340. The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955; Hindu Code.
341. Chu, supra note 78.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Jeremy Page, Indians offered a cash bonus to marry beneath their caste, THE TIMES
(LONDON), Sept. 15, 2006, at 43.
345. When Love Spells Death, THE HINDU, Nov. 2, 2003, available at http://www.thehindu.
com/thehindu/mag/2003/11/02/stories/2003110200140200.htm (recounting sev-
eral stories of individuals in inter-caste marriages who were killed due to their
choice of marriage partners).
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setting fire to a 36-unit apartment building in Oak Forest, Illinois.346 The
man started the fire at the apartment of his pregnant daughter, son-in-law
and three-year-old grandson.47 All three died in the blaze.348 The man set
the fire because his daughter married a person from a lower caste.349
Often the police look the other way when attacks on members of inter-
caste marriages occur. However, "opposition to, intimidation of, and vio-
lence against inter-caste couples" recently drew the concern of a panel of
two justices on the Indian Supreme Court.350 Justices Ashok Bhan and
Markandey Katju directed government administrators and the police
throughout India to protect these couples against harassment and to pros-
ecute those who instigate this violence.351 Justice Katju stated:
The caste system is a curse on the nation and the sooner it is de-
stroyed, the better. In fact, it is dividing the nation at a time when
we have to be united to face the challenges before the nation.
Hence, inter-caste marriages are in fact in the national interest, as
they will result in destroying the caste system. However, dis-
turbing news is coming from several parts that young men and
women who unite in inter-caste marriages are threatened with vi-
olence, or violence is actually committed on them.352
In an effort to change societal mores, in 2006 the Ministry of Social
Justice and Empowerment proposed offering 50,000 rupees (E580) to
higher-caste people who marry spouses from the lowest three groups in
Indian society-Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes or OBCs.353 This is a
considerable amount given that the average annual income per capita in
India is only £280.354 Several states were already offering financial pay-
ments for inter-caste marriages, ranging from 2,000 rupees in West Bengal
to 50,000 rupees in Gujarat.355 The advancements in race relations result-
ing from interracial marriage in the U.S. make blacks--and American so-
ciety in general-better off than Dalits with regards to discrimination
against relationships.
Immigration of blacks from other parts of the world is also changing
the ancestral make-up of blacks in the United States. Immigrants are in-
creasingly competing with Ascendants for positions at colleges and uni-
versities, especially selective ones. Yet, the fact that blacks from the rest of
the world want to immigrate to the United States is compelling evidence
of the better position that African-Americans are in compared to Dalits.
346. Gerry Smith & Tina Shah, Grandfather Charged in Blaze that Killed 3: Caste Dispute
Cited in Oak Forest Fire, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2008, State & Regional.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. See Stefano Esposito & Rummana Hussain, Motive: 'He didn't like his son-in-law.'
Prosecutor says dad killed daughter, her family in fire, CHI. SUN TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008.
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V. CONCLUSION
The goal of this article was to compare the application of constitu-
tional and federal anti-discrimination law to the higher education oppor-
tunities of African-Americans in the U.S. to Dalits in India. In so doing,
we sought to provide an alternative view to the normal comparison of the
condition of African-Americans to non-Hispanic whites. We understand
the reason for this normal comparative framework to be a discussion of
the progress, or lack thereof, on the way to racial equality. This normal
comparative framework, however, carries with it an ongoing difficulty
for African-Americans. As discussed in detail above, the comparison to
non-Hispanic whites almost always leads to a perception that blacks have
not made major gains in combating oppression. Even when progress on
the road to racial equality is recognized, it is almost always accompanied
by a simultaneous recognition that there is still a long way to go. Thus, in
the midst of hope, there is always despair.
By shifting the comparative framework from non-Hispanic whites to
Dalits, the strengths, accomplishments and positive aspects of the Afri-
can-American struggle can more readily be identified. For example, the
equal protection justifications for affirmative action are viewed in a com-
pletely different light. We do not address whether more African-Ameri-
cans would benefit from affirmative action if it were based on a social
justice rationale instead of diversity. That question is foreclosed by thirty
years of Supreme Court opinions. However, basing affirmative action on
the widespread benefits of diversity and inclusion requires a much more
positive view of African-Americans than if it were based solely on no-
tions of social justice. These justifications stem from a respect for the point
of view of African-Americans instead of the notion that affirmative action
is needed in order to elevate a degraded African-American community.
Every college, university or graduate program that adopts affirmative ac-
tion admissions policies must believe (or at least articulate a belief) that it
enhances the education of all of its students. Thus, affirmative action op-
erates as a sort of welcome sign posted on the door inviting equals, as
opposed to an apology for making a group of people worse off through
historic oppression.
Comparing the higher educational opportunities of African-Ameri-
cans to Dalits also presents HBCUs in a much more positive light than the
normal comparative framework. A look at the situation regarding the
Dalits, who have never had separate colleges and universities, plainly
reveals that the black community in the United States was made better off
because of HBCUs. What becomes salient about HBCUs in this compara-
tive framework is not their shortcomings, but their strengths. This per-
spective makes it far easier to see how HBCUs have aided the African-
American community. Thus, regardless of the genesis of HBCUs, these
education institutions enhanced the higher education opportunities of
blacks in the past and continue to do so in the present.
In comparison to Dalits, the increasing diversity of black students-as
a result of immigration of other black nationalities and interracial mar-
riages-demonstrates how American society is in the process of overcom-
ing its history of racial oppression of African-Americans. This
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phenomenon is an indicator of widening racial acceptance. In addition,
the increase in immigration of foreign black students may be another in-
dicator of the increasing racial acceptance, since people within the African
diaspora expect to enjoy it when they come to the U.S. to pursue educa-
tion. The lack of immigrants seeking education in India may reflect the
lack of opportunities and equality there.
Our arguments are not meant to understate the serious issues facing
African Americans today. Reports generated by the No Child Left Behind
Act show the dire condition of educational achievement of blacks in com-
parison to non-Hispanic whites reported by virtually every community in
the United States. We are also aware of the gaps between blacks and non-
Hispanic whites on standardized tests used to determine admissions to
selective colleges, universities and graduate schools. We know about the
differences in college attendance and graduation rates between blacks
and non-Hispanic whites. We have also considered the socio-economic
statistics of income, family wealth, life expectancy, incarceration rates and
health-related disparities, and the image painted by them. But we are also
aware that in the almost 400 years that African descendents have been in
North America, comparing blacks to non-Hispanic whites has always led
to negative conclusions about African-Americans. As our world contin-
ues to become smaller because of developments in technology and means
of communication, it may become more appropriate to view the plight
and advancement of African-Americans in the U.S. to communities in
other places in the world. There are 160 million Dalits in India who would
consider African-Americans to have experienced substantial progress in
the way of achieving racial equality and opportunities in education and
professional development. While this view may not be the best, we hope
that it encourages broader considerations in the future of the progress of
African-Americans in the area of equality and anti-discrimination in the
United States.

